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DISSENTING FROM THE BENCH: THE RHETORICAL 
AND PERFORMATIVE ORAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG AND ANTONIN SCALIA 
Christine M. Venter* 
At least one dissent per year is read aloud from the bench 
by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. These occasions are often 
among the most dramatic events of the Court's calendar, as 
they feature a Justice speaking directly, and often 
passionately, to an audience which includes her fellow 
Justices. So, which cases tend to prompt these oral dissents, 
and what are the Justices' rhetorical strategies when they 
speak rather than just write their dissents? This Article will 
explore the answers to these questions by examining the oral 
dissents of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia from 
the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. These 
Justices were selected because they- were two of the most 
prolific oral dissenters and because they embody starkly 
contrasting judicial philosophies. The Article canvasses the 
concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of 
cases in which each Justice was more likely to orally dissent. 
This Article argues that Scalia 's rhetoric evinces a view of the 
law as "autonomous," operating independently of the facts of 
the case and ignoring the impact of the law on the litigants. 
He directed his dissents at the academy, perhaps in an effort 
to create a conservative counter canon. In contrast, 
Ginsburg's feminist jurisprudence espouses a view of the law 
as responsive to the facts and the need for social change. Her 
oral dissents often targeted cases involving discrimination, 
and she frequently spoke directly to those affected by unequal 
treatment, having experienced such treatment herself. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
''[Law} is constitutive, for through its forms of language and of 
life, the law constitutes a world of meaning and action: it 
creates a set of actors and speakers and offers them possibilities 
for meaningful speech and action that would not otherwise 
exist; in so doing it establishes and maintains a community, 
defined by its practices of language." 1 
1. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND 
LEGAL CRITICISM xiv (1994). 
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On November 7, 2018, United States Supreme Court Associate 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg fell and broke three ribs. 2 The response 
from her fanbase was swift and overwrought. People humorously 
responded on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, offering to wrap her 
in bubble wrap, or even donate their own ribs to her. 3 Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg achieved such cult-like status that she had a rapper name, 
a lookalike bobblehead doll, and she counted Stephen Colbert among 
her fans. 4 Clips and memes of her doing push-ups and lifting weights 
abound on the internet.5 A movie, a documentary, and multiple books 
have all celebrated her extraordinary contributions to the law and 
introduced her to a broader audience. 6 There can be no doubt that 
she has a place in popular culture. 
This level of fame may seem odd given that many Americans are 
unable to identify any Supreme Court Justice;7 Ginsburg is one of the 
few exceptions. Moreover, Ginsburg did not exactly shy away from 
her fame but rather used it to draw attention to and amplify her 
opinions, both informally and on the Court. She opined on the 
number of women on the Supreme Court and penned scathing 
dissents in several landmark cases.8 Ginsburg even went so far as to 
2. Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 85, Breaks 
Ribs in Fall, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/ 
11/08/supreme-court-justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-85-has-broken-her-ribs-in-a-
fall.html. This Article was written prior to the death of Justice Ginsburg on 
September 18, 2020. 
3. Megan McCluskey, People Promptly Offer Bones of Their Own After Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg Fractures Her Ribs, TIME (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:54 AM), 
https://time.com/5449074/ruth-bader-ginsburg-broken-ribs/. 
4. The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, Protect Ruth Bader Ginsburg at 
All Costs, YouTuBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXN 
r9kkquyQ (CBS television broadcast originally aired Nov. 9, 2018). 
5. See, e.g., Valentina Zarya, If You Could Do as Many Push-Ups as Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, You Wouldn't Retire Either, FORTUNE (Sept. 22, 2016, 11:45 
AM), https://fortune.com/2016/09/22/ruth-bader-ginsburg-pushups/. 
6. See, e.g., RBG (Betsy West and Julie Cohen 2018); lRIN CARMON & SHANA 
KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG (2015); 
ON THE BASIS OF SEX (Focus Features 2018). 
7. Chris Cillizza, Can You Name a Supreme Court Justice? You're in the 
Minority, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/201 7 /03/21/people-have-absolutely-no-clue-who-is-on-
the-su preme-court/. The article claimed that only about 43 percent of likely 
voters polled could name one Supreme Court Justice; meaning 57 percent oflikely 
voters could not even name one. Most Justices were still unknown to that 43 
percent of voters, with only Justice Ginsburg, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice 
John Roberts reaching double digits in terms of percentage of voter knowledge. 
8. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 739---72 
(2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169-91 
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In 2012 at the Tenth Circuit Bench & Bar 
Conference at the University of Colorado in Boulder, Ginsburg was discussing 
the status of women in the law and observed, "[n]ow the perception is, yes, women 
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read several of these dissents aloud from the bench. Moreover, she 
treated those bench dissents as performances, by donning her special 
"dissenting collar" to signal to her audience what was to come.9 
Although the practice of reading dissents aloud from the bench is 
not new, it has become more pronounced in recent years.1° 
Additionally, Ginsburg was not the only Justice to adopt this practice. 
Justice Scalia, among others, was also known for reading his most 
scathing dissents aloud relatively frequently and using his larger-
than-life persona to expand his devoted following.1 1 While a divided 
and more politically partisan Court may help explain why the practice 
has become more common in recent years, 12 it does not fully account 
for the phenomenon or answer the most basic questions: Why dissent, 
and for whose benefit? In particular, what kinds of cases prompt a 
Justice to dissent in this performative manner, and finally to whom 
are they speaking, and what do they anticipate accomplishing with 
these performances? 
are here to stay .... And when I'm sometimes asked when will there be enough 
[women on the Supreme Court] and I say when there are nine, people are 
shocked .... [But no one] ever raised a question [when there were nine men]." 
Ginsburg Wants to See All-Female Supreme Court, CBS (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:06 
AM), https://washington.cbslocal.corn/2012/11/27 /ginsburg-wants-to-see-all-
female-supreme-court/. 
9. Kavitha George, The Powerful Meaning Behind Each One of RBG's 
Collars, BUSTLE (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-do-ruth-bader-
ginsburgs-collars-mean-each-one-has-a -special-story-9288551. 
10. Timothy R. Johnson et al., Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme Court 
Justices to Dissent from the Bench?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1560, 156EH>7 (2009). The 
authors note that "[t]he reading of dissents from the bench [on the Roberts Court] 
demonstrates disharmony on the Court .... " Id. at 1563. Suzanna Sherry has 
suggested that the phenomenon of the Justices making their opinions through 
dissenting opinions has become problematic because Justices are driven by 
"aspirations of celebrity." See Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How 
to Fix It), 106 IOWA L. REV. 181, 194 (2020). She asserts that the Court should 
return to issuing its opinions per curiam. Id. at 197-200. 
11. Scalia read approximately 7.9 percent of his dissenting opinions from the 
bench while Ginsburg read about 10.6 percent of her dissenting opinions aloud 
according to William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, "The Brooding Spirit of the 
Law''.· Supreme Court Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J., 
no. 1, 2010, at 1, 6. Justice Breyer is also known for reading some of his dissents 
aloud from the bench. Id. at 6. Scalia had a devoted following among 
conservatives. See Jeffrey Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/ 
what-made-antonin-scalia-great/462837/. Rosen asserts, "[m]ore than any justice 
since the liberal lion William Brennan, Scalia changed the way Americans debate 
the Constitution, and for that he deserves great respect." Id. 
12. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party 
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, SUP. CT. REV., 
2016, at 301, 302-04, 310-11, 314-20. 
2021] DISSENTING FROM THE BENCH 325 
This Article will attempt to answer those questions by closely 
examining the dissents that have been read aloud from the bench by 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia during the period from 2000 
through 2019. 13 It will offer up several alternative explanations in an 
effort to answer these questions but will start by positing two 
important precepts: one, that the questions cannot be asked in a 
vacuum without exploring the general role of dissent in our legal 
system; and two, that there is something different about the 
rhetorical situation when a Justice speaks from the bench as opposed 
to authoring a written dissent. When one speaks one's opinion aloud, 
it implies that a Justice is initiating a conversation, as opposed to 
making a pronouncement. That conversation may not only be 
directed at her fellow Justices for posterity but at other contemporary 
audiences too.14 
According to Mikhail Bakhtin, 15 speaking and writing imply an 
audience or audiences that are ready to respond. Who are these 
audiences, and what does the fact that the Justices are engaging in 
oral conversation through dissents say about their view on the role of 
the Court and the role of dissent in society? We generally see the role 
of the Court as to "close what has been open" by deciding cases in an 
authoritative manner.16 This Article argues that Justices who choose 
to orally dissent are challenging that notion by suggesting that the 
case is not necessarily closed and that even though one's fellow 
Justices have not been persuaded, there are other receptive audiences 
that might respond. Justice Ginsburg engaged in a discussion with 
13. This period was chosen because at least one dissent was read orally from 
the bench in each year of this period. Jill Duffy & Elizabeth Lambert, Dissents 
from the Bench: A Compilation of Oral Dissents by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 
102 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 33---37 (2010). Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016, so 
his dissents for the period 2000-2015 are canvassed. 
14. It is generally accepted thatjudges use their dissents to "speak" to the 
majority, among other audiences. Justice Ginsburg admitted as much when 
asked about her audiences noting that "there is nothing better than an 
impressive dissent to lead the author of the majority opinion to refine and clarify 
her initial circulation." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). See generally M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim 
to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, SUP. CT. REV., 2007, at 283---
344 (examining the history of dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme 
Court). 
15. Mikhail Bakhtin espoused the view that just as the author had the 
responsibility of creating an answerable discourse, so too was the listener 
required to respond in some way. Bakhtin argued "[r]esponsive understanding 
is a fundamental force, one that participates in the formulation of discourse, and 
it is moreover an active understanding, one that discourse senses as resistance 
or support enriching the discourse." M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 
280-81 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981). 
16. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 1545, 1564 (1990). 
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the public when she chose to dissent, while Justice Scalia attempted 
to cement his position in posterity when he dissented. The Article 
will canvass the forms of rhetoric used by Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg in their oral dissents and explore what motivated the 
Justices to publicly become the faces of oral dissenting opinions. 
Among these factors were their ideologies and a desire to send a 
message to particular audiences. With respect to Justice Scalia, this 
Article suggests that he had a desire to burnish his judicial reputation 
and even to write dissents worthy of becoming "canonical." The 
Article further suggests that Justice Ginsburg was much more 
concerned with a more immediate response to her dissents, with 
effecting change, and with engaging a broader audience. Because 
Scalia and Ginsburg had very different judicial and political 
philosophies and very different audiences, the cases on which they 
chose to orally dissent help identify the motives behind these oral 
performances. 
This Article will proceed in five parts: Part II will first provide a 
historical overview of the development of dissenting opinions, 
describing how the Court moved from seriatim opinions to oral 
dissents in the Dred Scott17 case. Part III will briefly canvass the 
autonomous and responsive views of the law and suggest that those 
legal philosophies are embodied by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg 
respectively. Part IV will describe the methodology of the study 
which examined the bench dissents of Justice Scalia during the period 
from 2000 to 2015 and Justice Ginsburg's oral dissents from 2000 to 
2019. Parts V and VI will provide a detailed multi-faceted analysis of 
cases where Justices Scalia and Ginsburg orally dissented. In doing 
so, these parts will discuss notions of rhetoric, audience, tone, and the 
kinds of authorities on which the Justices relied to convince their 
listeners. Part VII will conclude. 
II. THE HISTORY, FuNCTION, AND PURPOSE OF DISSENT 
Although current society has become relatively comfortable with 
dissent, that was not always the case, particularly in the early years 
of the republic. 18 Permitting dissent is, in effect, a statement that one 
is confident enough that a young democracy can withstand what may 
be perceived as threats to the legal order, where a court of final appeal 
openly displays disagreement. Thus, in the early days of United 
States legal history, dissenting opinions were not always welcomed, 
as they signaled to the public a lack of consensus on the issue, which 
might undermine the weight of the judgment. 
17. 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857). 
18. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States 
Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 137, 137-38 (1999). 
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A. The Historical Development of Dissents 
In developing a judicial identity, the Supreme Court in the early 
years of the founding of the United States looked to what it knew and 
modeled itself after the High Court in the United Kingdom.19 Its 
practice thus initially, in the first decade of its existence from 1790 to 
1800, was to issue decisions seriatim, whereby all of the Justices 
issued their own opinions and thereafter announced a short summary 
of issues agreed on by the Justices. 20 The role of dissent was minimal 
in these situations as the summaries sought to highlight what the 
individual Justices had in common, in order to determine the opinion, 
rather than issues on which they disagreed. Occasionally, too, the 
Court during that period would issue a per curiam opinion. 21 Many 
of these opinions were limited to cases where no reasoning or legal 
analysis was attached to the opinion, and they essentially amounted 
to merely an order. Hence, dissent was not a salient feature of the 
Court in its early years. 22 
During this period, the Court also initiated the practice of issuing 
an opinion by the Chief Justice "for the Court," rather than by the 
author of the opinion himself. 23 This was a practice that would later 
be enthusiastically adopted by Chief Justice Marshall, whose 
particular philosophy about the role of the Court was that it should 
present a united front to endow the opinion with more authority. 24 
He considered dissents anathema and fortunately had the personality 
to bring the other Justices around to his way of thinking; per curiam 
opinions thus became common during his tenure.25 
The practice of one Justice issuing an opinion "for the Court" 
made sense given the time and context in which that practice 
developed. For a new democracy that had thrown off the colonial yoke 
and drafted a new constitution, it was important that the law be clear 
and consistent. Unanimity, or what was shared in common, was more 
important than the Justices' personal interpretations and differences. 
In that spirit, a per curiam opinion was rarely challenged with a 
19. Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of 
Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 187-91 (1959). 
20. See Henderson, supra note 14. 
21. Kelsh, supra note 18, at 139-40. 
22. Id. at 140. 
23. Id. at 141-42 (noting that this practice attaches a significant amount of 
weight to the opinion of one Justice, usually the Chief, which may give rise to 
issues of doctrinal consistency). 
24. Id. at 143-44. 
25. See R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as an American Original: Some 
Thoughts on Personality and Judicial Statesmanship, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1365, 
1369, 1378-79 (2000) (noting that ''Marshall settled for a constitutional union 
which would weather 'the various crises of human affairs,' as he put it in 
McCulloch v. Marylancf'). 
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dissent; even concurrences were relatively rare.26 For example, in his 
concurrence in Sims v. Irvine, 27 Justice Iredell was at pains to point 
out his general agreement with the Court, noting, "[t]hough I concur 
with the other Judges of the Court in affirming the Judgment of the 
Circuit Court, yet as I differ from them in the reasons for affirmance, 
I think it proper to state my opinion particularly."28 
Thomas Jefferson strongly disliked the Court's new habit of 
issuing one opinion on behalf of the Court and argued that judges 
were shirking their responsibilities by moving away from seriatim 
opinions.29 However, Marshall was fairly successful at keeping both 
seriatim opinions and dissents to a minimum. Todd Henderson notes 
that it was not until 1804 that the first dissent was recorded after the 
appointment of William Johnson to the Court.30 It is no surprise that 
Jefferson, a true Republican, had appointed Johnson, as their 
philosophies regarding the role of judges coincided. 31 After Johnson's 
appointment, dissents were occasionally issued; however, this was 
not a frequent practice, largely due to the personality of Marshall, 
who urged compromise during conferences and required all the 
Justices to live in the same boarding house during the Court's term. 32 
This practice forced the Justices to interact frequently both at the 
Court and in the evenings when they dined together. They were thus 
often able to resolve any disputes about cases that came before them 
outside of the courtroom and out of the public eye. There were also 
strong sociopolitical norms that frowned on dissent. For example, in 
1898, the Albany Law Journal urged that "[t]here never should be a 
dissenting opinion in a case decided by a court of last resort."33 Its 
rationale for this position was that "[n]o judge, lawyer or layman 
should be permitted to weaken the force of the court's decision, which 
all must accept as an unappealable finality."34 
Henderson notes that "as factions developed within the Court, 
the percent of cases with a dissenting opinion increased from four 
percent under Marshall to nearly ten percent under his immediate 
26. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 142-43. 
27. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799). 
28. Id. at 457 (Iredell, J., dissenting). See also Brown v. Md., 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat) 419, 449 (1827) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (announcing his dissent "with 
some reluctance, and very considerable diffidence"). 
29. Kelsh, supra note 18, at 145-46. 
30. Henderson, supra note 14, at 317. 
31. See id. at 317-18 (referring to "a series ofletters between Jefferson and 
Johnson in 1822, [in which] the former urged the latter to dissent in nearly every 
case"). Jefferson apparently did so in order to break Marshall's grip on the Court 
and his practice of writing opinions for the Court. Id. at 318. 
32. Id. at 313, 321. 
33. Henry Wollman, The Stability of the Law - The Income Tax Case, 
Address before the Greenwood Club, Kansas City, Mo. (1898), in 57 ALB. L.J. 74, 
74 (1898). 
34. Id. 
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successors."35 But to focus only on the low number of dissents and 
laud the role of the Chief Justices in achieving that stated goal, is to 
ignore the fact that dissents do not really threaten the unity of the 
country or the fabric of democracy. It also undermines the importance 
of dissents to a robust democracy. As Robert Ivie has noted, 
"[d]emocracy exists only in the presence of dissent."36 It was during 
Marshall's successor Roger Taney's term as Chief Justice that one of 
the Court's most impactful dissents was read aloud from the bench. 37 
In fact, not just one but two dissents were read in the Dred Scott 
case. 38 The entire process of announcing the opinion and reading the 
dissents aloud took about five hours and began the tradition of oral 
dissents that has prevailed for over two hundred years. Nowadays, 
however, the Justices summarize their dissenting opinions when they 
read them from the bench. These summaries themselves afford the 
Ju_stices another opportunity to convey their opinions on the case, as 
the Justices do not merely limit themselves to reading their opinions 
aloud-they can use more colorful or colloquial language or choose to 
emphasize certain parts of the dissent. 
B. The Dred Scott Case and Dissenting from the Bench 
Dred Scott provides some insight into the multiple functions 
served by oral dissents. Scholars generally concur that the dissent 
proffered by Justice McLean was designed not only to express his 
disagreement with the majority but, in large part, was designed to 
preserve and advance his political aspirations-he wished to run for 
president.39 Thus his dissent may have been designed in part to 
enhance his status, be mentioned in the press, and thereby reach a 
particular audience (potential voters). McLean's dissent was 
therefore more of a political statement than a measured insightful 
legal analysis. It is not surprising, then, that it is often overshadowed 
by Justice Curtis's dissent, as the latter comprised a methodical 
rebuttal of each of the points raised by the majority.40 
Justice Curtis's dissent in the Dred Scott case is ranked among 
the anti-canonical dissents, and it enjoyed a particular status even at 
35. Henderson, supra note 14, at 321. 
36. Robert Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 46, 49 (2015). 
37. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 154 ("As a whole the Taney Court had a 
higher non-unanimity rate than the Marshall Court (20% vs. 11%)."). 
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 529-64 (1857) (McLean, J., 
dissenting); id. at 564-633 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
39. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and 
Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 564 (2009); William G. Ross, 
Legal Scholarship Highlight: Presidential Ambitions of Supreme Court Justices, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 9, 2012, 12:39 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/ 
legal-scholarship-highlight-presidential-ambitions-of-supreme-court-justices/. 
40. See Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis's Dissent in the Dred Scott Case: 
An Interpretative Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 510 (1997). 
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the time it was disseminated. 41 Abraham Lincoln was said to be so 
inspired by Curtis's dissent that he kept a copy of the dissent in his 
pocket and even specifically addressed it in a speech. 42 It was said to 
have inspired the Republican party and the antislavery movement.43 
Even Taney, who took a counter position to Curtis, crafted his opinion 
in response to Curtis's dissent, almost entirely overlooking 
McLean's.44 The press took note of this, reporting on the case as a 
battle between Taney and Curtis and publishing those two opinions 
in full, while summarizing the rest of the Court's. 45 Justice Curtis 
appeared to be aware of the intense interest in the case, turning over 
his dissent to a reporter shortly after delivering it, in contrast to 
Justice Taney, who withheld his own opinion both from the Court and 
eager reporters. 46 The intense interest in the Curtis dissent allowed 
Justice Curtis to enhance his own status. This is an important benefit 
that may be attained by dissenting from the bench that current 
Justices are not unaware of. 
Although the Dred Scott case commenced the practice of orally 
dissenting, the practice did not take hold immediately. While the 
number of separate opinions increased slightly after Marshall 
resigned, the practice of unanimity dominated the Supreme Court for 
over one hundred years. 47 That was in large part because of the 
judicial philosophy of Taft who stated: 
I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases 
where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand 
41. Richard Primus, Essay, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 
DUKE L.J. 243, 256 n.48 (1998) (listing commentators who regard Justice Curtis's 
dissent in Dred Scott as canonical). Not all scholars agree on the anti-canonical 
or canonical status of Dred Scott. Id. at 256. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson 
argue that there are "a baker's dozen reasons why Dred Scott continues to deserve 
a central place in the canon of American constitutional law." Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 
49, 49-50 (2007). 
42. Streichler, supra note 40, at 510. In a speech on June 26, 1857, Lincoln 
urged Americans not to accept the Dred Scott decision as settled precedent. He 
stated, "[b]ut we think the Dred Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court 
that made it, has often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can 
to have it to over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it." 2 Abraham Lincoln, 
Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 398, 401 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/1/ 
lincoln/lincoln2/. 
43. Paul Finkelman, Essay, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of 
Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 36 (1996); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or 
Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 61, 97 (2011). 
44. See Streichler, supra note 40, at 516. 
45. Id. at 511 n.16. 
46. Ross E. Davis, Essay, The Last Word, 11 J. A.PP. PRAc. & PROCESS 229, 
253-55 (2010). 
47. See Kelsh, supra note 18, at 174-78. 
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by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record 
my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain 
than to have it settled either way.48 
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Brandeis concurred with this approach, famously writing that 
"[i]t is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled [ ... ] 
than that it be settled right."49 He went on to note that ''he would join 
opinions he disagreed with just for the sake of settling the law."50 
Norms against dissent, for example, were so prominent in the 1920s 
that they were explicitly embraced in Canon 19 of the American Bar 
Association's 1924 edition of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "It is of 
high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should 
use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and 
the consequent influence of judicial decision."51 
That approach has not been the approach of the contemporary 
Court regarding dissents. Moreover, the number of dissents read 
from the bench also seems to have increased exponentially in recent 
years. 52 Aside from the politically partisan confirmation hearings 
that have produced a divided Court and that seem to have rendered 
existing divisions more contentious, 53 there is more attention given to 
the Court by the media, in part because it has recently been deciding 
politically contentious cases.54 Moreover, the audience for the Court 
is more varied than in the Court's earlier existence. Robert Post 
posits that "[t]he authority of our Supreme Court is different from 
48. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 61 (1964). 
49. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Ironically, Brandeis issued this statement while dissenting 
himself. 
50. Henderson, supra note 14, at 284. 
51. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 19 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1924), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_resp 
onsibility/pic_migrated/1924_canons.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2021). 
52. See Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7-8; cf Kelsh, supra note 18, at 
17 4-78 (discussing the dramatic increase of the rate at which dissent was 
expressed beginning in 1941). 
53. Blake and Hacker refer to a "declining norm of consensus [which] 
reflected the changing role of the Court in American life ... and was expressed 
in the ideological differences among the justices .... " Blake & Hacker, supra 
note 11, at 4. 
54. The Court has recently decided, or will shortly be deciding, some 
contentious cases involving the scope of executive power. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC 
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (separation of powers); 
Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (the census citizenship 
question); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (racial 
gerrymandering); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (immigration). All of 
these cases appeared in the headlines and attracted public attention. Moreover, 
as Suzanna Sherry has argued, some of the justices seem to be cultivating a 
celebrity-type public persona in part through dissenting in contentious cases. See 
Sherry, supra note 10, at 185-93. 
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that of the Taft Court because modern opinions now routinely engage 
in an ongoing dialogue with American legal academia. Supreme 
Court opinions both reflect and constitute the role of the Supreme 
Court itself."55 Moreover, since there is no serious question about the 
Court's legitimacy, the Court does not need to present a united front, 
and dissent is not seen as threatening the Court's stability.56 This is 
clearly illustrated by the relative lack of unanimous decisions in 
Supreme Court cases during the 1990s,57 as compared to the Taft 
Court, which tended to be more unified.58 
III. AUTONOMOUS AND RESPONSIVE VIEWS OF THE LAW AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DISSENTS 
While it has become clear that Justices feel free to dissent in 
cases on which they feel strongly, since society's tolerance for dissents 
has risen, and dissents have even come to be valued by the academic 
community as a means of providing insight into the Court's 
deliberative process, these reasons do not fully explain why or in what 
circumstances a Justice may choose to dissent from the bench. 
Analyzing the facts and legal issues in the cases in which Justices 
orally dissent and assessing those vis-a-vis the Justices' legal 
philosophies and their views on the role of the Court may assist in 
predicting the kinds of cases which prompt oral dissents. If Justices 
view their roles and the role of the Court as being to articulate 
established general legal principles to resolve not only the litigants' 
legal issues but to clarify and maintain certainty in the law, then they 
will likely dissent generally only when the majority appears to ignore 
55. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: 
Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1267, 1275 (2001). 
56. This may no longer hold true as Richard Fallon has suggested that 
divisions over confirmations of Justices, like those occurring in Justice 
Kavanaugh's confirmation, threaten the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. See 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 165-67 
(2018). 
57. Adam Feldman has noted that there was a 90 percent unanimity rate in 
the 2013, 2016, and 2019 terms in respect to the first ten decisions of each term. 
Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Amid Record-Breaking Consensus, the 
Justices' Divisions Still Run Deep, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2019, 1:28 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02/em pirical-scotus-amid-record-breaking-
consensus-the-justices-divisions-still-run-deep/. Feldman has also asserted that 
"[t]he court under Roberts (and Chief Justice William Rehnquist) steadily 
increased the percentage of unanimous decisions across terms so that reaching a 
level of unanimous decisions in orally argued cases of 50 percent is no longer an 
anomalous occurrence." Id. 
58. Post notes that "[o]fthe 1,554 full opinions announced by the Taft Court 
during the 1921-1928 Terms, 84% were unanimous; of the 507 full opinions 
announced by the Court during the 1993-1998 Terms, only 27% were 
unanimous." Post, supra note 55, at 1283. 
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or misstate the rules. This would align with the view that the Court's 
role is to '"sufficiently ... elaborate the principles, ... to make the 
discussion of those principles and the conclusion reached useful to the 
country and to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of 
constitutional and fundamental law."'59 If however, a Justice's 
judicial philosophy predisposes her to be more responsive to the facts 
and context of cases, she may be more likely to dissent in cases with 
hard facts or cases which expose deep societal issues. 
However, while some may argue that Justices also dissent for 
personal philosophical and jurisprudential reasons, these reasons 
usually align with or are related to the respective Justice's views on 
the role of the Court and on the role oflaw in society generally. Robert 
Post has identified two primary views of the role of the Court and the 
role oflaw; he ascribes to Nonet and Selznick's terminology, referring 
to these views as the autonomous view and the responsive view.60 
Post describes the autonomous view as asserting that "[t]he task of 
the judiciary is to maintain fidelity to a system of certain and definite 
rules, even at the cost of 'the adaptation oflaw to social facts."'61 This 
view seeks to use precedent in such a way so as to create a sense of 
the inevitability of the outcome. 62 Rules, principles, and authority are 
all important, and the particular facts of the case are less so. One 
may identify a Justice's affiliation with the autonomous view by 
closely analyzing both the rhetoric and analytical methodology of that 
Justice's opinions. As Burke and others have pointed out, in crafting 
judicial opinions, judges who subscribe to the autonomous view speak 
with authority, finality, and even a sense of inevitability. 63 They 
consider opposing arguments and address those by distinguishing the 
authority cited by the losing side. They give short shrift to facts and 
focus almost entirely on the law. This all contributes to the sense of 
inevitability and certainty that is commonly found in these types of 
judicial opinions. Robert Ferguson points out how "[t]he monologic 
voice, the interrogative mode, and the declarative tone build together 
in what might be called a rhetoric of inevitability."64 Justices who 
favor this approach use precedent in such a way that a particular 
59. Id. at 1304 (footnote omitted). 
60. See id. at 1381-82. 
61. Id. at 1381 (footnote omitted); see also PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP 
SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 64 
(Transaction Publishers 2001) (1978). 
62. See Post, supra note 55, at 1381-82. 
63. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, PRACTICE EXTENDED: BEYOND LAW AND 
LITERATURE 126 (2016) (quoting KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 258-
59, 379-80 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1969) (1945)) ("Burke sees 
present and future things in terms of a now fixed past; legal precedents establish 
just such a relationship by creating an 'immutable scene ... of "eternal truth, 
equity, and justice.""'). 
64. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. 
& HUMANS. 201, 213 (1990). 
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outcome seems a foregone conclusion, despite the fact that most cases 
that reach the Supreme Court do so because there are circuit splits; 
there are strongly contested and often polarized views of what the law 
is or ought to be; or, there are important policy considerations at 
stake.65 Moreover, Justices who ascribe to the autonomous view tend 
not to be moved by the facts of the case before them or any sociological 
or extralegal forms of authority. Their opinions may be identified by 
a commitment to textualism, originalism, and strict use of 
precedent. 66 
If, however, a Justice believes that the law should be responsive 
to social change and should evolve to take into account changing 
social circumstances or the facts of a particular case, that Justice's 
view of the law may be described as responsive. Philippe Nonet and 
Philip Selznick describe this approach as requiring the law to assume 
an "openness and flexibility" that does not comport with strict rule-
bound decision making.67 Under the responsive model, the results of 
a case may be less predictable as it becomes "more difficult to 
distinguish legal analysis from policy analysis, legal rationality from 
other forms of systematic decision making."68 Judges who subscribe 
to this approach are more keenly aware of social forces and are more 
likely to be persuaded by policy and factual arguments. They will 
likely refer to the facts more directly in their opinions. This approach 
appears to be favored by Justice Ginsburg, who has shown herself to 
be attuned to social change, particularly the changing roles of women 
in society and the discrimination that persists despite those changes. 
Post has pointed out that when lawyers cease to understand the law 
as "a grid of fixed and certain principles designed for the settlement 
of disputes" and come instead to understand it as "the site of ongoing 
processes of adjustment and statesmanship designed to achieve social 
purposes,"69 then dissents may be used as part of an ongoing societal 
conversation about the appropriate course of action in achieving those 
purposes. 
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES, COGNITIVE CLARITY, AND THE 
ORAL DISSENTS OF JUSTICES SCALIA AND GINSBURG 
Whether Justices ascribe to the autonomous or responsive 
approach has significant implications for the ways in which they write 
their opinions or dissents, the audiences they seek to persuade, the 
authorities on which they rely, and the rhetorical choices that they 
make in choosing what to emphasize and de-emphasize in their 
opinions. H.L.A. Hart once asserted that dissenting opinions "have 
65. See id. at 213-16. 
66. See Post, supra note 55, at 1381-82. 
67. NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 61, at 78. 
68. Id. at 83. 
69. Post, supra note 55, at 1274. 
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no consequences within the system ... because no one's rights or 
duties are altered thereby."70 However, that assertion only stands if 
the "system" is "defined narrowly as the set oflegal rules and not the 
institutions through which law is pronounced and through which it 
acquires social legitimacy."71 More recently, dissent has come to be 
seen as a healthy component of democracy, as a challenge to the 
monologic voice of the majority opinion, and as a more democratizing 
form of judicial speech that engages an audience and invites a 
response. 72 
Dissenting has become a well-established practice of the Court, 
in contrast to earlier years when the practice was frowned upon. 73 
Indeed Justice Douglas wrote that: 
The right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable 
for a judge of an appellate court ... the affairs of government 
could not be conducted by democratic standards without 
it .... It is the right of dissent, not the right or duty to conform, 
which gives dignity, worth, and individuality to man. 74 
Nowadays, dissents offer a space for the dissenting Justice to 
advance alternative interpretations of the law. As Guinier has 
pointed out, oral dissents may provide opportunities for 
"instantiating and reinforcing the relationship between public 
engagement and institutional legitimacy."75 Because Justices Scalia 
70. H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (3d ed. 2012). 
71. Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century 
Lawyers and the Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALEJ. L. & HUMANS. 507,533 (2012). 
72. Lani Guinier, Beyond Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, 
and the Possibilities of Demosprudence-Courting the People: Demosprudence 
and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2009) [hereinafter Guinier, 
Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide]. Guinier asserts that 
''Demosprudence is a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence. It describes 
lawmaking or legal practices that inform and are informed by the wisdom of the 
people. Demosprudence, unlike traditional jurisprudence, is not concerned 
primarily with the logical reasoning or legal principles that animate and justify 
a judicial opinion. Demosprudence is instead focused on enhancing the 
democratic potential of the work of lawyers, judges, and other legal elites. 
Demosprudence through dissent attempts to understand the democracy-
enhancing potential implicit and explicit in the practice of dissents." Lani 
Guinier, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term: Demosprudence Through 
Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15---16 (2008) [hereinafter Guinier, Demosprudence 
Through Dissent]. 
73. See, e.g., Post supra note 55, at 1283 (asserting that in the Court's early 
years there were norms and established institutional practices that operated 
against dissent. Those norms and practice are no longer in place and dissenting 
opinions have become relatively routine). See also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm 
of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 365 (2001). 
7 4. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4-5 (1960). 
75. Guinier, Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, supra note 72, at 
544. 
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and Ginsburg were so well-known and had such a popular following, 
and because of the strongly-worded rhetoric of their dissents, they 
created rhetorical spaces for their respective audiences to engage with 
them on the issues before the Court. 76 By speaking, and not just 
writing their dissents, they engaged with and demanded a response 
from their audiences in a way that written dissents did not. 
A limited amount of research on oral dissents has been 
conducted. While they may be reported on in the popular press, until 
recently there has been no readily accessible database of bench 
dissents.77 The practice of the Court is for the Chief Justice to 
announce who will deliver a summary of an opinion being handed 
down in a particular case; then, the Chief Justice will announce if 
there is to be an oral dissent and advise the onlookers who will deliver 
it. 78 In reading a dissent from the bench, a Justice may choose how 
much of the dissent to read, and whether or how to paraphrase it. My 
research shows that a Justice typically spends between five and 
twenty minutes reading his or her dissent. 79 The wording and 
organization of the oral dissent typically very closely track that of the 
written dissent, but the sentences used tend to be shorter and 
therefore are easier to understand and follow. Unlike in their 
published dissents, the Justices tend not to cite to authority in 
support of their assertions, unless it is to extremely well-known 
authority. This makes spoken dissents more accessible to the public 
and press. 
This following Subpart will analyze the oral dissents of Justices 
Scalia and Ginsburg during the period from 2000 to 201980 and 
examine the subject matter, audiences, and rhetoric of their dissents. 
These two Justices were chosen for a number of reasons, not least of 
which is that they engaged in the practice of oral dissent at a much 
76. LoRRAINE CODE & ROBERT AYSON, RHETORICAL SPACES: ESSAYS ON 
GENDERED LoCATIONS ix (1995) (describing rhetorical spaces as fictive places 
which "structure and limit the kinds of utterances that can be voiced within them 
with a reasonable expectation of uptake and 'choral support"'). Lloyd Bitzer 
concurs, noting the rhetorical situation is "a natural context of persons, events, 
objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance." Lloyd F. 
Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 4 (1968). 
77. In 2009, Jill Duffy and Elizabeth Lambert compiled a list of Supreme 
Court oral dissents which they have now begun updating. See Duffy & Lambert, 
supra note 13, at 23. Oral dissents are also available under each case on the 
Supreme Court website. See OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/. A written 
transcription of the oral dissent is also available there, but there are often errors 
in the transcriptions. Id. 
78. Duffy & Lambert, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
79. See, e.g., infra Subpart IV.A. 
80. Oral dissents were analyzed from 2000---2015 in the case of Justice Scalia 
because of his death on February 13, 2016. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice 
on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https://www .nytimes.com/2016/02/ 14/us/ antonin-scalia -death.html. 
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higher rate than their fellow Justices. Justice Scalia read 
approximately 7.9 percent of the dissents he authored from the 
bench.81 Justice Ginsburg read around 10.6 percent of her dissents 
from the bench.82 Moreover, these two Justices embody the two 
disparate approaches of an autonomous view and a responsive view 
of the law respectively, as well as having different jurisprudential 
ideologies (conservative versus liberal). This Article asserts that a 
Justice will usually choose to orally dissent primarily on ideological 
grounds and usually when she believes that the majority has reached 
so profoundly a wrong conclusion that a written dissent will not 
suffice.83 Moreover, this Article posits that dissenting orally attracts 
more press attention and thus communicates the Justice's position to 
a broader audience whom she seeks to engage in dialogue over the 
issue. The Article argues that Justices use their popular personas to 
garner attention for the dissents, and that in doing so, the Justices 
begin a conversation about the issue that may result in legislative or 
policy changes. 
A. Data and Methodology of the Study 
The following Subparts will analyze the legal issues, facts, and 
authorities relied on, as well as potential policy considerations for 
dissenting, in the most recent oral dissents of Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg. The Justices' rhetoric will also be explored, including their 
likely intended audiences, the tone of the dissents, and whether their 
judicial philosophies are communicated through their rhetoric. The 
tables attached as Appendices A and B categorize the types of cases 
in which each Justice dissented and rank the readability scores of 
those cases.84 The underlying hypothesis of this study was that 
Justice Scalia would orally dissent in cases involving an 
interpretation of the Constitution that departed from originalism or 
in statutory cases where, in his opinion, the Court was departing from 
the plain meaning of the text. It was further anticipated that Justice 
Ginsburg would dissent in cases where the Court failed to recognize 
discrimination in its various guises, or where the Court ignored the 
factual realities of the litigants and the impact of the Court's decision 
on those litigants. These hypotheses were ultimately supported by 
the data. Moreover, a Justice was most likely to read a dissent from 
the bench when the Court was split 5:4. Justice Scalia dissented in 
81. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7. 
82. Id. 
83. See generally Johnson et al., supra note 10 (establishing such premise). 
84. The readability levels were evaluated using The Flesch Kincaid Grade 
reading level, the Gunning Fog scale, the Cole Liau Index and the SMOG scale. 
The Flesh Kincaid Grade reading level takes the most factors into account, so the 
analysis primarily relied on that score. Details about how the other scales 
evaluate the readability of the dissents is contained in the attached Appendices. 
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three cases out of fourteen in which there was not a 5:4 split.85 Justice 
Ginsburg similarly dissented in three cases in which there was not a 
5:4 split.86 
The methodology for the analysis was as follows: 
1. The legal issues were briefly analyzed in each case to 
determine if there was any predictable or common pattern in the 
types of cases in which Ginsburg and Scalia chose to orally dissent. 
2. The oral dissents were then analyzed according to their 
cognitive and rhetorical complexities using Flesch Kincaid and other 
reading scales87 to determine the readability level of these texts and 
ascertain whom the Justices might be inviting to engage in dialogue 
with them about the cases. Potential audiences for the dissents were 
canvassed, including information that Justices themselves provided 
about their audiences. While programs that measure reading ease 
and complexity like the Flesch Kincaid scale are not dispositive in 
respect of audiences, given that legal opinions are often inherently 
complex and difficult to read due to legal terminology and subject 
matter, any significant difference between the levels of complexity 
between the Justices may nevertheless shed some light on their 
audiences. Another limitation of using reading complexity is that 
these formulae do not measure cognitive clarity. Owens and 
Wedeking's concept of cognitive clarity were thus also canvassed. 
3. The types of authorities and sources on which each Justice 
relied in the dissents were evaluated to ascertain if there is a 
predictability or pattern to the authorities on which dissenting 
Justices rely. 
85. The three cases in which Justice Scalia dissented were King v. Burwell, 
576 U.S. 4 73, 498-518 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the constitutionality of the 
ACA); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(the constitutionality of Texas's anti-sodomy laws); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (whether mentally disabled people 
should be excluded from the death penalty). 
86. Ginsburg dissented in American Legion v. American Humanist 
Association, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103-13 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a First 
Amendment case); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893-
914 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a jurisdiction case); and Cheney v. U.S. 
District Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 396-405 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (a 
separation of powers case). 
87. "A reading difficulty[, or readability,] measure can be described as a 
function or model that maps a text to a numerical value corresponding to a 
difficulty or grade level." See Michael Heilman et al., An Analysis of Statistical 
Models and Features for Reading Difficulty Prediction, in EANL '08: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD WORKSHOP ON INNOVATIVE USE OF NLP FOR BUILDING 
EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS 71, 71 (Ass'n Computational Linguistics ed., 2008). 
The Flesch Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and other similar measures are 
examples of such scales. 
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4. The dissents were then subjected to a rhetorical analysis to 
evaluate the Justices' language, tone, and the figures of speech used. 
The analysis revealed the following general results: Justice 
Scalia's dissents were unsurprisingly overwhelmingly issued in cases 
involving constitutional issues or textual questions involving issues 
of statutory interpretation. This is consistent with his judicial 
preferences for originalism, textualism, and federalism. However, his 
ideological preferences were also clearly indicated in his oral dissents, 
as his more vituperative rhetoric was reserved for cases involving 
LGBTQ rights, the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), and the death 
penalty. His dissents required a slightly more sophisticated reading 
level than Justice Ginsburg's88 but were cognitively clearer than hers, 
at least according to Owens and Wedeking's scale. 89 Scalia relied 
almost exclusively on the Constitution itself, the writings of the 
Framers, the statute in question, or on precedent as authority for his 
decisions.9° In his dissents Scalia often specifically decried relying on 
sociological authority or taking any exigent factual circumstances or 
policy into account. He addressed the majority directly on multiple 
occasions, where his tone tended to convey his outrage at what he 
viewed as the Court overstepping its role. This outrage tended to be 
expressed by means of memorable phrases or metaphors which 
strongly denoted Justice Scalia's contempt for the majority's opinion. 
His phraseology suggests that the dissents were intended for the legal 
academy and posterity. Justice Scalia generally spent about ten 
88. Complexity was calculated using the F1esch Kincaid reading ease scale 
which measures the average number of words used per sentence. Then the 
average number of syllables per word are factored in. The average number of 
words is then multiplied by 0.39 and added to the average number of syllables 
per word, multiplied by 11.8. 15.59 is then subtracted from the result. See The 
Flesch Grade Level Readability Formula, READABILITY FORMULAS, 
https://readabilityformulas.com/flesch-grade-level-readability-formula. php (last 
accessed Apr. 25, 2020). Both Justices' dissents were evaluated as around 40 
which would make them difficult to read according to the Flesch Reading Ease 
scale. 
89. This is according to Owens and Wedeking, who rank Justice Scalia's 
opinions and dissents as among the clearest of the Justices in their study. Ryan 
J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the 
Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 L. & Soc'y REV. 1027, 1043 
(2011). Scalia's cognitive clarity in part derived from his originalist approach 
which adjudicated issues as constitutional based on whether the Founders would 
have viewed them as constitutional. See infra Part V. According to my results 
Justice Scalia's dissents require a full grade higher reading level than Justice 
Ginsburg's. 
90. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS xxvii-xxix (2012). 
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minutes reading his dissents aloud. 91 If one examines the types of 
cases in which Scalia dissented, they seem to constitute what could 
be construed as an anti-canon. Jamal Greene describes the anti-
canon as being decided by "the attitude the constitutional interpretive 
community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision 
has come to represent, and the susceptibility of the decision to use as 
an antiprecedent."92 Specifically, Justice Scalia took a particularly 
hostile view towards the majority's opinions in respect of the 
expansion of gay rights and limitations on the death penalty. If it 
was Scalia's intention in writing these dissents that his decisions 
would someday be seen as visionary and adopted by the majority, he 
appears doomed to be disappointed as gay rights now seem firmly 
entrenched in the law, as do the ethical considerations that the death 
penalty should not be imposed on minors or people with intellectual 
disabilities. 
Justice Ginsburg's oral dissents, in contrast, tended to be issued 
in cases involving any form of discrimination, whether employment 
discrimination or in respect of access to reproductive rights. Her oral 
dissents are slightly more accessible to a broader audience than 
Justice Scalia's, in that the reading level required to comprehend 
them is lower than the level required by Justice Scalia's dissents.93 
However, they are cognitively more complex because they take 
disparate views into consideration and tend not to see the issue in 
shades of black and white.94 Justice Ginsburg relied on a more 
diverse range of sources including sociological sources, factual 
evidence, testimony before Congress, and transcripts from the trial 
court record. She was also slightly more inclined to assert her own 
personal experience into the dissents and was more keenly attuned to 
the facts of the cases in which she dissented, as well as the impact 
that the decision would have on the litigants. Ginsburg also resorted 
to rhetorical techniques often associated with feminist jurisprudence 
to convey her points. This suggests that her audience was not 
necessarily the legal academy but may have included the majority, 
the press, the public, and the litigants themselves. She also often 
91. See e.g., Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 14:29-24:10, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-
184. 
92. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381 (2011) 
(emphasis omitted); see also Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided''.· 
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 681-82 (2005); J.M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
963, 1018-19 (1998); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative 
Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009). 
93. On average Justice Ginsburg's dissents required a thirteenth grade level 
to understand, while Justice Scalia's require a fourteenth grade level. See infra 
Appendices A and B. 
94. At least according to Owens and Wedeking's definition of cognitive 
complexity. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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exhorted Congress to act or the Court to change its mind. Her tone 
was notably less acerbic than Scalia's when she read her dissents, as 
if she was still attempting to persuade the Court or Congress. The 
Justice spent an average of about six minutes reading a summary of 
her dissents aloud.95 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,96 
however, her oral dissent took approximately fifteen minutes.97 
The data in the attached table in Appendix A illustrate that three 
of Scalia's fourteen oral dissents came in Eighth Amendment cases,98 
three came in respect to Fourteenth Amendment cases,99 two in 
respect to habeas corpus, and one each in respect to the First, Fourth, 
and Sixth Amendments;10o the rest pertained to Congress's taxing 
authority, federalism issues, administrative law, and statutory 
interpretation.101 
In respect to Justice Ginsburg, the data attached in Appendix B 
shows that she orally dissented in nineteen cases during the period of 
2000 to 2019. Not surprisingly, four of her dissents came in Title VII 
95. See infra Appendix B. 
96. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
97. See Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:01-14:26, Part Two, Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-354. 
98. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 550-51 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 713 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(addressing the Fourth Amendment); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 151-53 
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing the Sixth Amendment); Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826---27 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing habeas 
corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 655-56 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(same); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (addressing the First Amendment). 
101. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 67 (2015) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (addressing statutory interpretation and federalism issues); King 
v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 4 73, 498 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing 
Congress's taxing authority, administrative law, and statutory interpretation); 
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 525 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (addressing administrative law and statutory interpretation); 
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416---17 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(addressing federalism issues). 
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cases, 102 two came in equal protection cases, 103 one in respect to the 
right to abortion, 104 and one in respect to access to contraception,105 
The rest were a range of presidential powers, sovereign immunity, 
class action certification, injunction standards, and a Section 1983 
claim. 106 
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S AUTONOMOUS VIEW OF LAW: RULE -BASED 
DISSENTS AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY As AUDIENCE 
In their study of the complexity of Supreme Court opinions, 
Owens and Wedeking have found that Justice Scalia's opinions are 
the clearest out of those of a cohort of seventeen Supreme Court 
Justices. 107 Using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count ("LIWC") 
system of assessment, which focuses on cognitive clarity, (i.e., the 
clarity of the ideas discussed), Wedeking and Owens have found that 
Scalia consistently authors the clearest opinions, no matter what area 
of law is before the Court.1°8 They further note that dissents tend to 
be written even more clearly than majority opinions, and once again, 
Scalia's dissents are the clearest among the Justices. 109 It should be 
noted that Owens and Wedeking based their assessment solely on 
cognitive clarity as opposed to doctrinal or rhetorical clarity. 110 
102. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 451 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 363 (2013) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,608 (2009) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S 618, 643--44 
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
103. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 334 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 620 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
104. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
105. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 739 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
106. See Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 45--46 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 79 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing a Section 1983 claim); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S 367, 395-96 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing 
presidential powers and injunction standards). 
107. The Justices include Alito, Black, Blackmun, Brennan, Breyer, Burger, 
Douglas, Ginsburg, Harlan, Kennedy, Marshall, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, 
Roberts, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Stewart, Thomas, and White. 
108. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1038---39, 1043. 
109. Id. at 1033. The authors note, "every justice in our sample authors 
clearer dissents than majority opinions. All justices in recent history present 
their opinions differently when in dissent-and the difference is large for many 
justices. Look first at Justice Scalia . . . . When he authors a majority opinion, 
Scalia's complexity score is -0.099 [-0.464, 0.267]. When he authors a dissent, 
however, his complexity score drops to -2. 788 [-3.246, -2.33]." Id. at 1046. 
110. Rhetorical clarity is usually measured by the Flesch Kincaid and other 
scales, while doctrinal clarity would be assessed by analyzing the Court's 
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A. Justice Scalia: Cognitive Clarity, Textualism, and Originalism 
"The Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but 
dead, or, as I prefer to call it, enduring . ... It means today not 
what current society, much less the Court, thinks it ought to 
mean but what it meant when it was adopted." 111 
Wedeking and Owens define cognitive complexity as comprising 
differentiation and integration. They assert that: 
Differentiation represents the degree to which an individual 
acknowledges multiple perspectives or dimensions associated 
with an issue. In other words, ... whether an individual 
perceives and explains events in black and white or sees the 
world in shades of gray. Integration, on the other hand, 
represents the degree to which a person recognizes 
relationships and connections among these perspectives or 
dimensions. It represents how an individual structures his or 
her thoughts and organizes decision-relevant information. 112 
Thus, judges who tend to disregard multiple perspectives and 
view things in more absolute terms tend to write clearer opinions. 
This may largely explain why Justice Scalia's opinions were 
determined to be the clearest. Scalia appears to have subscribed to 
the autopoietic or autonomous approach to law. 113 As previously 
referenced, the autonomous view of the law asserts that ''law's 
intellectual and systemic development proceeds according to a logic, 
procedure, and rationale of its own." 114 In other words, law operates 
autonomously and without regard for social conditions and changed 
circumstances.115 Adopting an autopoietic view of the law means that 
decisions in the same area of law to determine if the Court has used and applied 
terms and concepts consistently. See id. at 1038. 
111. Jeffrey Toobin, The Trump Impeachment Hearings and Justice Antonin 
Scalia, NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
commen tithe-trump-impeachment-hearings-and-justice-antonin-scalia ( quoting 
Antonin Scalia). 
112. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1038----39. 
113. Several authors have described the autonomous view oflaw as being an 
example of an "autopoietic system," that is, a system that is closed and reproduces 
itself by essentially only relying on its own constructs to validate itself. See, e.g., 
Dimitris Michailakis, Law as an Autopoietic System, 38 ACTA SOCIOL0GICA 323, 
329 (1995). See also Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous is Law?, 3 ANN. REV. 
L. & Soc. SCI. 45, 46 (2007) (contrasting the autonomous view of the law to other 
socio-legal studies). 
114. Tomlins, supra note 113, at 46. 
115. See id. at 4~7 (defining the meaning oflaw as a closed system); see also 
Gunther Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 
18 L. & Soc'y REV. 291, 292 (1984) (quoting Humberto Maturana who describes 
such a system as one that "produces and reproduces its own elements by the 
interaction of its elements"). 
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one ignores virtually any contextual, social, or political factors in 
determining the outcome of a case. Decisions made in the autopoietic 
process derive their validity from normative rules such as the texts of 
the Constitution, statutes, or existing precedent; 116 the judges 
making those decisions do not generally have recourse to nonlegal 
texts, facts, policy, or other extraneous considerations. There is a 
circularity and a certain self-referential structure to that process. As 
Michailakis has reiterated, "[t]his basal circularity of the law is the 
foundation for legal autonomy. One cannot speak of legal autonomy 
if conflicts are decided in the general context of political and social 
processes."117 Whether one approves of this approach, it generally 
makes the outcome of a case clear because it is reached by applying 
fixed rules. Since this was Scalia's methodology, it is not surprising 
that his opinions rank as the clearest and easiest to read by Owens 
and Wedeking. 
Scalia's deep commitment to originalism, formalism, and 
textualism prompted him to write opinions or dissents as if there 
could only be one correct outcome. That outcome was unfailingly 
dependent on the text or previously established authority, regardless 
of changed social circumstances or the facts of a particular case.118 
Alongside his reliance on originalism in interpreting the Constitution 
as the Framers understood it, Scalia saw his role generally as stating 
and implementing the law as it was written. 119 The "text is the law," 
he once wrote, and he endeavored to faithfully maintain that position 
despite compelling facts or legislative history. 120 "Of all the criticisms 
leveled against textualism," he once wrote, "the most mindless is that 
it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is, of course it's formalistic! The 
116. Michailakis, supra note 113, at 327 (explaining that the ''legal system 
determines what is in accordance with law and what is not"). 
117. Id. at 330 (quoting Teubner, supra note 115, at 295). 
118. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1179-80 (1989). 
119. Mark Sherman, In Victory or Dissent, Scalia was a Man of Strong 
Opinions, CHI. TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2016, 5:43 PM), https://www.chicago 
tribune.corn/politics/ct-scalia-strong-opinions-20160213-story.html. 
120. Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
783, 788 (2017). Berman writes: "In a coauthored book published fifteen years 
after A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia asserts that 'we are governed not by 
unexpressed or inadequately expressed ''legislative goals" but by the law'; that 
'the true law is' what an enacted text 'state[s]'; and that 'it is the text's 
meaning ... that binds us as law."' Id. at 791 n.25. Berman asserts, "Statements 
such as these all indicate a constitutive claim. Other passages in the same book, 
however, strongly indicate that Scalia continues to understand his project in 
prescriptive terms, as when he and Garner insist that the textual-originalist 
approach they advocate is 'unapologetically normative, prescribing 
what ... courts ought to do with operative language."' Id. 
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rule of law is about form ... Long live formalism. It is what makes a 
government a government of laws and not of men."121 
Scalia also urged the use of canons of interpretation, rather than 
legislative history, to interpret texts where the plain meaning was not 
obvious, insisting that if "judges followed these 'valid canons' they 
would be more constrained and law would be more predictable."122 He 
also tended not to be moved by the facts of a particular case before the 
Court. He once chided that "[r]eporters cared too much whether the 
'little old lady won or lost' before the Supreme Court."123 "I couldn't 
care less," he noted, "as long as we get the law right."124 This 
approach whereby law becomes essentially self-referential is, as 
Michailakis has noted, the medium by which the law itself reproduces 
its normative elements.12s 
Scalia urged a rigorously applied, rule-based philosophy, 
asserting: 
When one is dealing, as my Court often is, with issues so 
heartfelt that they are believed by one side or the other to be 
resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not greatly appeal to 
one's sense of justice to say: "[w]ell, that earlier case had nine 
factors, this one has nine plus one." Much better, even at the 
expense of the mild substantive distortion that any 
generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously 
enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the 
decision. 126 
Scalia seemed comfortable with the effect of these "mild 
substantive distortions" on the litigants. He even went so far as to 
suggest that the outcome of any one particular case might be 
irrelevant. 127 He decried "the attitude of the common-law judge-the 
121. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 25 (1997). 
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 
113 CouJM. L. REV. 531, 534 (2013) (book review). Eskridge asserts that Scalia 
and Garner's "exegesis of dozens of canons actually undermines the conceptual 
theses of the book and of Scalia's legisprudence" in part because they cherry-pick 
their canons, as well as the fact that the canons themselves demand normative 
analysis. Id. at 535-37. 
123. Sherman, supra note 119. 
124. Id. 
125. Michailakis, supra note 113, at 327; see also Teubner, supra note 115, at 
295. 
126. Scalia, supra note 118, at 11 78. 
127. As he told Harvard students with respect to one particular case, "if you 
think it is terribly important that the case came out wrong, you are not yet 
thinking like a lawyer-or at least not like a common lawyer. That is really 
secondary. Famous old cases are famous, you see, not because they came out 
right, but because the rule of law they announced was the intelligent one." 
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mindset that asks, 'What is the most desirable resolution of this case, 
and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result be 
evaded?"'128 The Justice even once poked fun at this formulaic 
methodology of interpreting laws according to whether they would 
have been constitutional at the time of the Framers. In an interview 
with New York Magazine, Scalia noted: 
[I]f a state enacted a law permitting flogging, it is immensely 
stupid, but it is not unconstitutional. A lot of stuff that's stupid 
is not unconstitutional. I gave a talk once where I said they 
ought to pass out to all federal judges a stamp, and the stamp 
says ... STUPID BUT CONSTITUTIONAL. 129 
This rule-based philosophy does generally have the effect of 
rendering opinions, whether majority or dissenting, clear. Although 
in their study Owens and Wedeking did not analyze the Justices' 
opinions and dissents according to doctrinal clarity, Scalia's opinions 
would presumably have ranked highly in clarity on that scale too, 
since his philosophy as an "honest originalist" was relatively 
consistent.130 However, when analyzing Justice Scalia's oral dissents 
in respect to rhetorical clarity, because of their erudite references, 
they require a more educated listener or reader. Hence an analysis 
based on rhetorical clarity provides additional insights about the 
audience and purpose for his dissents. 
B. Rhetorical Clarity and Justice Scalia's Dissenting Anti-Canon: 
Audience, Language, Tone, and Impact 
"The language of the law, along with other discourses of the 
powerful, lays down the very terms within which subordinate 
groups are able to experience the world and articulate their 
aspirations. ''131 
Rhetorical clarity is often assessed in terms of how accessible the 
text is to the reader. 132 Among the most common assessment tools for 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Lecture at 
Princeton University (Mar. 8-9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES, at 79, 82 (1978). 
128. Id. at 88. 
129. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 4, 
2013), https://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/. 
130. See id. Scalia referred to himself as an honest originalist in a 
conversation with New York Magazine, noting ''I try to be an honest 
originalist!" Id. 
131. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 170 (1991). 
132. Scott Consigny, Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle's Concept of 
Rhetorical Clarity, 17 RHETORIC Soc'Y Q. 413, 414 (1987) (''If the proper function 
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determining clarity, often used interchangeably with readability or 
accessibility, are the Flesch Kincaid Reading scale and other similar 
tools.133 These tools focus on sentence length, the complexity of the 
vocabulary used, and the clarity of the ideas expressed. 134 
Accessibility is often recorded as a grade reading level. 135 The idea 
that legal opinions should be rhetorically clear is not new. Judge 
Posner, for example, argued that judicial opinions should be readable 
by lay persons. 136 Assessing Justice Scalia's oral dissents using a 
combination of reading scales shows that his dissents rated slightly 
more complex than Justice Ginsburg's. They required a fourteenth 
grade reading level to comprehend them, while Justice Ginsburg's 
required a thirteenth grade level. This distinction held true for other 
scales like Coleman Liau, the SMOG Index, and the FOG scale, which 
also all measure similar factors. The reading ease level of Scalia's 
dissents was also slightly, but not significantly, higher than 
Ginsburg's. 137 
of rhetorical speech is to transparently transmit the rhetor's meaning-namely, 
his reasoned interpretation of a given situation-without undue distortion or 
interference, then presumably Aristotle's rhetor should eschew deceptive verbal 
ornamentation."). 
133. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, READABILITY FORMULAS, 
https://readabilityformulas.com/flesch-reading-ease-readability-formula.php 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2021). See also The Coleman-Liau Readability Formula 
(also known as The Coleman-Liau Index), READABILITY FORMULAS, 
https://readabilityformulas.com/coleman-liau-readability-formula.php (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2021); The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula, 
READABILITY FORMULAS, https://readabilityformulas.com/gunning-fog-readability 
-formula.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2021); How to Use the SMOG Readability 
Formula on Health Literacy Materials, READABILITY FORMULAS, 
https :/ /readabilityf ormulas.com/ articles/how-to-use-smog-readability-formulas-
on-health-literacy-materials. php (last visited Apr. 25, 2021). 
134. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note 133; The 
Coleman-Liau Readability Formula (also known as The Coleman-Liau Index), 
supra note 133; The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula, supra 
note 133; How to Use the SMOG Readability Formula on Health Literacy 
Materials, supra note 133. 
135. The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note 133; The 
Coleman-Liau Readability Formula (also known as The Coleman-Liau Index), 
supra note 133; The Gunning's Fog Index (or FOG) Readability Formula, supra 
note 133; How to Use the SMOG Readability Formula on Health Literacy 
Materials, supra note 133. 
136. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal 
Courts - One Judge's Views, 51 DuQ. L. REV. 3, 9 (2013) (arguing that a judicial 
realist appellate judge, among other factors "wants judicial decisions to 'make 
sense' in a way that could be explained to, and persuade, a lay person ... [and] 
has a distaste for legal jargon and wants judicial opinions, so far as possible, to 
be readable by non-lawyers .... "). 
137. Scalia's reading ease number was 14.05 grade level required, while 
Ginsburg's was 13.3. This means Scalia's dissents were slightly more challenging 
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However, in assessing the rhetorical clarity of oral dissents, to 
focus only on readability indices ignores other important rhetorical 
components like the kinds of cases in which Justice Scalia dissented 
and what he actually said in dissent, along with his voice and tone. 
Moreover, just because his dissents were relatively accessible does not 
mean that his audience was the public. Although his oral dissents 
were reported in the press, the audience he was apparently targeting 
was more specific than the general public. 
1. The Anti-Canon-Why Justice Scalia Tended to Dissent 
One of the hypotheses of this study was that because of Scalia's 
commitment to originalism and textualism, he would reserve his most 
scathing dissents for cases where the majority focused on the 
particular circumstances of a case or achieving a particular outcome 
rather than the "text" or "rules" themselves. That hypothesis proved 
to be generally true. However, there was also an ideological pattern 
to Scalia's dissents which suggested that ideology played an outsized 
role-almost as if Scalia were trying to fashion a conservative anti-
canon. If one looks at the pattern of his dissents, two were in death 
penalty cases: one involving a man with an intellectual disability, and 
one involving a defendant who had committed crimes while a 
minor. 138 In those cases, as discussed more fully below, Scalia 
disregarded factual evidence regarding the petitioners' mental 
disability and immature cognitive abilities, respectively, in favor of 
his assertion that defendants like them should nevertheless be 
executed. He was also outraged at the thought of providing habeas 
rights and due process for Guantanamo detainees139 or upholding the 
ACA. 14° Finally, he was steadfast in his outspoken rejection of rights 
than Ginsburg's. See The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula, supra note 
133 (The specific mathematical formula is: 
FKRA = (0.39 x ASL)+ (11.8 x ASW) - 15.59 
FKRA = Flesch-Kincaid Reading Age 
ASL= Average Sentence Length (i.e., the number of words divided by the number 
of sentences 
ASW = Average number of Syllable per Word (i.e., the number of syllables divided 
by the number of words)). 
138. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555--56 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
139. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 655 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
140. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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being accorded the LGBTQ community, as evidenced by his dissents 
in Lawrence, 141 Windsor, 142 and Obergefell. 143 
Based on the fact that he tended to dissent on ideological 
grounds, one might assume that Scalia aspired to write so-called 
canonical dissents--dissents that are later redeemed for their 
holdings by future courts, or serve as warnings for the future, and 
thus shape constitutional development.144 Primus has suggested that 
dissents may become canonical because "of the identity of their 
authors, the number of Justices who joined them, their literary 
merits, the general philosophy they espouse, or the issues upon which 
they were written."145 The major canonical dissents that are widely 
accepted are Plessy, 146 Lochner, 147 Olmsted, 148 Korematsu, 149 and the 
free speech dissents by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 150 Scalia 
certainly generated the larger-than-life persona required of a 
canonical author, wrote eloquently and entertainingly, and made it 
clear that, at least on occasion, he was writing for the wisdom of a 
141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
142. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 798 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
143. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 713 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
144. Primus, supra note 41, at 243, 245 ("Constitutional law ... has not only 
a canon composed of the most revered constitutional texts but also an anti-canon 
composed of the most reviled ones. Lochner and Plessy are anti-canonical cases."). 
145. Id. at 250. See also Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the 
Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784 n.11 (2000) ("It follows that, in 
order for a dissent to be canonized, it must both be famous and be the subject of 
frequent reference within the legal community. As fame is a difficult quality to 
measure, this Article gauges the status of individual dissents by the number of 
favorable references they have garnered in subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions-with ten references as a baseline for canonical status."). 
146. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552---64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
148. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
149. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242-48 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dis sen ting). 
150. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). See also Krishnakumar, supra note 145, at 795 n. 73 ("[Brandeis's 
concurrence in Whitney] is often considered a dissent because Holmes and 
Brandeis disagreed with the majority on substantive grounds, concurring in their 
judgment only because of a procedural issue (e.g., the defendant had failed to 
raise the clear-and-present danger defense, on which Holmes and Brandeis based 
their finding that his actions were lawful, at the trial level). The Whitney 
concurrence has been cited 51 times .... The dissent in Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), has been cited 26 times.") 
(citations omitted). 
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future day.151 Primus suggests that judges who ascribe to the 
autonomous view of law tend to see their audiences as the legal 
academy because of their intellectual contributions to the law. 152 
Consistent with this, Scalia himself acknowledged that his 
audience was primarily the legal elite and that the function of dissent 
is to put "the Court in the forefront of the intellectual development of 
the law."153 Ferguson has noted that often "judges associate their own 
views with a correct course in history"154 which Scalia seems to have 
done, as he used phrases like "[t]he Nation will live to regret what the 
court has done today,"155 and this ruling "will almost certainly cause 
more Americans to be killed."156 Ferguson asserts that: 
Even more than historians, they Liudges] need to find 
themselves on the victorious side in a continuum of past, 
present, and future, and their natural recourse is the telling 
example, which brings history to bear in manageable doses. 
Judgment, after all, is not a record of the past; it uses the past 
selectively in an assessment of normality or, more rarely, in a 
prescription for a possible normalization.157 
One may intuit Scalia's desire to normalize his own moral 
approach, and at the same time write canonical dissents, when 
examining some of the prophetic and sweeping phrases that he used. 
He opened his dissent in Windsor with the words, "[t]his case is about 
power in several respects. It is about the power of our people to 
govern themselves, and the power of this Court to pronounce the law. 
Today's opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable 
consequence of diminishing the former."158 In the same case, he 
closed his dissent, "[b]ut the Court has cheated both sides, robbing 
the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that 
comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better."159 In 
Lawrence, he accused the Court of having signed on to the 
''homosexual agenda," claiming that: 
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in 
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as 
151. Primus, supra note 41, at 278-79. 
152. Id. at 251. 
153. David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On 
Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL .APPROACHES 112 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999). 
154. Ferguson, supra note 63, at 214. 
155. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 850 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
156. Id. at 828. 
157. Ferguson, supra note 63, at 214. 
158. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
159. Id. at 802 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's 
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as 
protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that 
they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it 
as "discrimination" which it is the function of our judgments to 
deter. So imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-
anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the 
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream .... "160 
351 
In King v. Burwell, 161 he referred back to National Federation, 162 
a case in which Justice Kennedy read their joint dissent from the 
bench, noting that "the cases will publish forever the discouraging 
truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws 
over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and 
assist its favorites." 163 However in many of Scalia's dissents, he 
appears to be on the wrong side of history in that his dissents seek to 
deny rights to people like the LGBTQ community, criminal 
defendants who are mentally disabled or emotionally and cognitively 
immature, noncitizens seeking habeas and due process rights, or 
people who lack health care. The approach taken by Scalia in all of 
those respects does not bend towards justice. His dissents on those 
cases might then be considered part of a dissenting anti-canon, rather 
than the canon. 
2. The Rhetoric of Rules-A Disregard for Facts 
Justice Scalia demonstrated his stated philosophical approach 
about viewing law as a set of rules without regard to the parties before 
the Court in multiple oral dissents and, in so doing, dispelled any 
doubt that his audience was not the litigants. One of the most 
compelling examples of this was his dissent in the death penalty case 
of Roper v. Simmons. 164 Three years earlier in Atkins, 165 a death 
penalty challenge involving a mentally disabled defendant convicted 
of murder, Scalia orally dissented from the majority opinion which 
found the death penalty unconstitutional for individuals with mental 
disabilities. 166 In his oral dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia spoke (and 
later wrote) dismissively about the trend among states of enacting 
statutes prohibiting the execution of defendants with mental 
disabilities, noting "the oldest of the statutes is 14 years old, five were 
160. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
161. 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
162. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
163. 576 U.S. 473, 518 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Nat'l Fed'n of 
lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)). 
164. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
165. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
166. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 6:55, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002) (No. 00-8452), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-8452. 
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enacted last year, over half were enacted in the past eight years."167 
Scalia showed little to no concern for the fate of the Petitioner himself 
and even questioned the level of his mental disability, referring to 
him as "mildly mental[ly] retarded."168 Similarly in Roper, he wrote 
scathingly of "the evolving standards of decency of our national 
society,"169 which the majority had found militated against the death 
penalty being imposed on defendants who had committed crimes 
while minors. Scalia derided the notion that a "national consensus" 
against executing minors could have developed over a period of a mere 
fifteen years and criticized the Court for taking into account the fact 
that most other countries have banned the execution of minors. 170 He 
also critiqued studies that suggested that the moral decision-making 
abilities of minors was not fully developed. 171 He seemed to be 
unconcerned that, if his approach were to be adopted, the executions 
of minors would continue (at least in some states) until a more evident 
consensus had emerged in society. To ignore the particular defendant 
before the Court and others similarly situated is to ignore the fact 
that the law is concerned with people. 
James Boyd White urges young lawyers to consider the 
"humanity and inhumanity in speech, particularly in professional 
speech."172 Scalia might have been advised to take that adage into 
account in respect to Simmons and others like him. Boyd White also 
poses the question, "[w]hat does the writer choose to say about 
himself and his subject in the way he chooses to write?"173 When one 
reads Roper or Lawrence through the lens of that question, one is 
struck by Scalia's callous disregard of many of the individuals whose 
cases came before him, as he privileged the status quo and pure legal 
analysis over what Boyd White terms "the raw material of life."174 
Scalia's rhetoric in these cases embodies the kind of tough 
mindedness that Wetlaufer has described in other contexts as a 
commitment to "orderliness in discourse, to objectivity, to clarity and 
logic, to binary judgment, and the closure of controversies."175 This 
kind of impersonal voice and autopoietic approach, while it may be 
clear, ignores the lives and experiences of the litigants before the 
Court while purporting to neutrally dispense justice. Yet in so doing, 
it also ignores the fact that these "rhetorical 
commitments ... disempower the already powerless ... [and] 
167. Id. at 12:00-12:12. 
168. Id. at 8:44---8:51. 
169. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 10:00-10:10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-633. 
170. Id. at 10:11-10:19. 
171. Id. at 12:50. 
172. WHITE, supra note 1, at 109. 
173. Id. at 110. 
174. Id. at 243. 
175. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1552. 
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reinforce the existing distribution of power and wealth."176 Moreover, 
although Scalia asserted that his dissent was motivated by the 
conviction that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that 
of legislatures, 177 he seemed willing to substitute his own judgment 
for the facts in some cases. In Roper, he noted in respect to studies 
submitted by the American Psychological Association to the effect 
that minors did not have the same moral capacity to reason as adults, 
"[a]t most, these studies conclude that, on average, or in most cases, 
persons under 18 are unable to take moral responsibility for their 
actions. Not one of the cited studies opines that all individuals under 
18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes."178 Given that 
psychologists had testified that Christopher Simmons was "very 
immature," "very impulsive," and "very susceptible to being 
manipulated or influenced,"179 it seems extremely unlikely that 
Simmons fell into the category of minors who could fully appreciate 
the nature and consequences of his crimes. Moreover, as Justice 
Kennedy pointed out in the majority opinion, "[t]he experts testified 
about Simmons' background including a difficult home environment 
and dramatic changes in behavior, accompanied by poor school 
performance in adolescence. Simmons was absent from home for long 
periods, spending time using alcohol and drugs with other teenagers 
or young adults."1so 
Scalia's focus on the "rule" as opposed to sociological evidence or 
the facts was also evident during other oral dissents. In King u. 
Burwell, 181 he demonstrated his commitment to his vision of legal 
legitimacy-textualism-urging in his dissent that "[t]he plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred 
to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of 
a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful 
intellect would discover."182 Despite the finding of the majority in 
upholding the ACA as a constitutional exercise of Congress's taxing 
power, Scalia reiterated his "plain meaning'' approach in interpreting 
the statute, when he posited "[u]nder all the usual rules of 
interpretation, in short, the Government should lose this case."183 He 
went on to note sarcastically "[b]ut normal rules of interpretation 
176. Id. at 1596. 
177. Scalia questioned in Roper, "By what conceivable warrant can nine 
lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?" Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 79. Id. at 559. 
180. Id. 
181. 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
182. Id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 
267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925)). 
183. Id. 
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seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: 
The Affordable Care Act must be saved."184 
Contrast that approach with Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for 
the majority, which he began by noting the history and purpose 
behind the enactment of the ACA. "The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act ... grew out of a long history of failed health 
insurance reform."185 Roberts went on to point out that the "Act seeks 
to make insurance more affordable by giving ... tax credits to 
individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 
percent of the federal poverty line."186 In finding the ACA 
constitutional, he conceded that "[i]t is true that we generally try to 
avoid interpreting a statute in a way that makes some language 
superfluous. But we have said that is not an absolute rule, and it does 
not seem particularly helpful in interpreting this statute."187 The 
dichotomy between Scalia's and Roberts's approaches epitomizes the 
purely analytical versus the narrative approach, as Boyd White would 
put it, 1ss or the textual rule-based approach contrasted with one that 
took the sociological implications and legislative intent of the ACA 
into account. Roberts endorsed this approach when he asserted a 
"fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the 
legislative plan. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve 
health insurance markets not to destroy them."189 
Scalia's preference for textual legal legitimacy and his disdain for 
the majority's reliance on sociological legitimacy was also manifested 
in Obergefell v. Hodges, an opinion in which he strongly dissented but 
did not read from the bench; Chief Justice Roberts read his own 
relatively lengthy dissent from the bench instead.190 In response to 
the majority's finding that denying the benefits of marriage to same 
sex couples constituted a denial of equal protection and due process 
because it denied those couples dignity and the full protection of the 
law, Scalia noted dismissively, "[t]he world does not expect logic and 
precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them 
in the law. The stuff contained in today's opinion has to diminish this 
Court's reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis." 191 His 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 4 79 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
186. Id. at 482. 
187. Oral Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts at 7:11-7:27, Part 1, King v. 
Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14-114), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-
114. 
188. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 243, 245. 
189. Oral Opinion of Chief Justice Roberts at 10:43-10:53, Part 1, King v. 
Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (No. 14-114), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-
114. 
190. Oral Dissent of Chief Justice Roberts, Part Two, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556. 
191. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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disdain for relying on changed circumstances as a justification for the 
majority ruling also was strongly evident in Lawrence v. Texas and 
United States v. Windsor. In Lawrence, he posited that the majority's 
holding usurped the function of the legislature: "One of the benefits 
of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the 
courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their 
logical conclusion."192 He stated further, "[i]t is clear from this that 
the Court has taken sides in the culture war and in particular, in that 
battle of the culture war that concerns whether there should be any 
moral opprobrium attached to homosexual conduct."193 He then 
chided the Court for being "so imbued ... with the law profession's 
anti-anti-homosexual culture that it is seemingly unaware that the 
attitudes of that culture are not obviously "mainstream"; that in most 
States what the Court calls discrimination against those who engage 
in homosexual acts is perfectly legal."194 In Windsor, he rejected the 
notion that laws "favoring man-woman marriage no more demeans 
and humiliates other sexual relationships than favoring our 
constitution demeans and humiliates the governmental systems of 
other countries."195 Thus, in both cases he rejected the sociological 
evidence cited by the majority that showed that laws denying equal 
protection to LGBTQ groups impacted their dignity in ways that the 
Court should take into account.196 In Windsor, he registered his 
outrage when he decried the majority for essentially rendering 
anyone opposed to the traditional definition of marriage as "an enemy 
of human decency."197 
192. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 14:23-14:35, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102. He stated, 
"[s]ocial perceptions of sexual and other morality change over time and every 
group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is 
best, that homosexuals have achieved some success in that enterprise is attested 
to by the fact that Texas is one of the few remaining states that criminalized 
consensual homosexual acts, but persuading ones fellow citizens is one thing, and 
imposing ones views in absence of democratic majority will is something else." 
Id. at 13:01-13:35. 
193. Id. at 11:02-11:16. 
194. Id. at 11:56---12:18. 
195. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 5:22-5:35, Part Two, United States v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-
307. 
196. In Windsor, he averred, "[t]he majority is sure ... [the DOMA's] purpose 
is to disparage, injure, degrade, demean and humiliate our fellow human beings, 
our fellow citizens who are homosexual." Id. at 8:04--8:16. See also supra text 
accompanying notes 192-93 (describing Scalia's view that such discrimination is 
"perfectly legal" in "most states" and his displeasure with what he termed as the 
Court's involvement in a "culture war"). 
197. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 800 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). In both versions of the dissents he also used the Latin phrase "hostis 
humani generis." Id. at 798. 
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However, while he presented himself as a strict textualist, Scalia 
did not always consistently follow that approach. While Scalia had 
criticized the majority's approach in King, 198 as being one that 
essentially focused on the desired result and worked to interpret the 
law to achieve that result, he was not as contemptuous of that type of 
approach when it came to Brown v. Plata. 199 In that case, the 
majority upheld an injunction that resulted in the release of forty-six 
thousand convicted criminals from California's overcrowded 
prisons.20° The Court held that the release was mandated because of 
system wide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental 
health care that ... subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in 
California to 'substantial risk of serious harm' and cause the 
delivery of care in the prisons to fall below the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.201 
Scalia viewed the case as one "whose proper outcome is so clearly 
indicated by tradition and common sense, that its decision ought to 
shape the law, rather than vice versa."202 Although he had been 
critical of the Court's approach to reading the statute in King, he 
expressed surprise that the Court in Brown had declined to ''bend 
every effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous 
result."203 
Scalia also went on to express his unhappiness with the district 
court's fact finding in respect to the impact that the release of 
prisoners would have on the safety and welfare of the California 
public.204 The district court relied on expert testimony to conclude 
that "shortening the length of stay through earned credits would give 
inmates incentives to participate in programming designed to lower 
recidivism,"205 and that "slowing the flow of technical parole violators 
to prison, thereby substantially reducing the churning of parolees, 
would by itself improve both the prison and parole systems, and 
public safety."206 Scalia disputed the possibility that the court had 
been persuaded by the expert testimony, asserting without any 
apparent basis that, "the idea that the three District Judges in this 
case relied solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses 
is fanciful. Of course they were relying largely on their own beliefs 
198. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
199. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
200. Id. at 501---02. 
201. Id. at 505 n.3; see also id. at 551 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
202. Id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 556---57. 
205. Id. at 556. 
206. Id. 
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about penology and recidivism."207 Scalia penned this despite the fact 
that even he himself acknowledged that "the District Court devoted 
nearly 10 days of trial and 70 pages of its opinion to this issue."2os 
Additionally, Scalia's emphasis on textualism and originalism 
obfuscates the fact that this approach serves to protect the status quo, 
which is not necessarily neutral, often favors the already privileged, 
and may well serve to entrench the patriarchy. Katharine Bartlett 
has argued that a feminist approach to law requires ''looking beneath 
the surface of law to identify the gender implications of rules and the 
assumptions underlying them and insisting upon applications ofrules 
that do not perpetuate women's subordination."209 This approach is 
similar to that advocated for by critical race theorists or critical legal 
studies advocates, although their analysis of the law's potential 
discriminatory impact obviously extends beyond women. Critical 
race or legal theorists have exposed how law "can be substantively 
unfair or tilted toward the interests of the powerful"210 and thus 
undermine or negate the interests of the least powerful, including 
people of color, the LGBTQ community, women, and the poor and 
disenfranchised. In emphasizing the Constitution as its Framers 
originally intended it, Scalia overlooked the impact of that approach 
on these groups. 
It should also be noted that Scalia reserved some of his most 
outraged dissents for cases which contravened his jurisprudential 
philosophy-specifically instances where he asserted that the Court 
was fashioning the law to attain a particular end and, in doing so, had 
imposed the minority rule of an elite set of judges on the country.211 
Scalia urged that it was the reasoning of an opinion that commended 
it to its audience, noting that "an opinion that gets the reasons wrong 
gets everything wrong."212 This is not to suggest that Scalia took 
dissenting lightly. He recognized the potential serious consequences 
207. Id. at 557. 
208. Id. 
209. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 
843 (1990). 
210. Jack M. Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 64, 67 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009). 
211. An example of this would be King v. Burwell where Scalia maintained 
that the Court was engaging in a convoluted interpretation of the Affordable Care 
Act and in so doing twisting the language of the statute to achieve the desired 
end. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 509 (2015) (''The Court has not come 
close to presenting the compelling contextual case necessary to justify departing 
from the ordinary meaning of the terms of the law. Quite the contrary, context 
only underscores the outlandishness of the Court's interpretation. Reading the 
Act as a whole, leaves no doubt about the matter: 'Exchange established by the 
State' means what it looks like it means."). 
212. Antonin Scalia, The Nineteenth Annual Lecture: The Dissenting Opinion, 
Address given to the Supreme Court Historical Society as the Society's Annual 
Lecture (June 13, 199), in J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33 (Dec. 1994). 
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of a dissent on the institution of the Court, noting that "[t]he foremost 
and undeniable external consequence of a separate dissenting or 
concurring opm1on is to destroy the appearance of unity and 
solidarity."213 
3. The Court and the Separation of Powers 
Another consistent theme that emerges in several of Justice 
Scalia's oral dissents is that the Court is an elitist institution 
imposing its undemocratic will on the people and, in doing so, 
usurping the role of the legislature. Scalia seems to have believed 
that the federal government was impinging on the power of the 
states.214 In distancing himself vociferously from the majority in 
those types of cases, Scalia metaphorically opened up a large 
conversational space into which he invited conservative legal 
academia, future readers, and the public. In some cases, Scalia's tone 
is outraged, but in others, he affects a disinterested tone as if he does 
not have a stake in the outcome of the cases. In EPA v. EME 
Homer,215 for example, a case involving whether the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") could impose regulations to protect 
"downwind" states from the pollution of their "upwind" neighbors, he 
maintained that "these are not cases of earth shaking importance."216 
This pronouncement is similar to his affected disinterest in Lawrence 
v. Texas, wherein he asserted that despite his opposition to the Court 
finding Texas's law against sodomy unconstitutional, "[l]et me be 
clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group 
promoting their agenda through normal democratic means."217 
Scalia's word choice perhaps betrayed him as the idea that there is a 
''homosexual agenda" tends to be a claim advanced by the religious 
right. 
Moreover, while Scalia's insistence on deference to legislatures 
sounds like a neutral resolution of these cases in accordance with 
Article I of the Constitution, it ignores the facts that one, it is 
exceedingly difficult to get a constitutional amendment passed; and 
213. Id. at 35. 
214. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), wherein he wrote 
"[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program .... 
[S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty." Id. Printz involved the constitutionality of 
background checks under the Brady Act. Id. Much of Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion was devoted to a discussion of the Federalist Papers. 
215. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014). 
216. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 00:10---0:13, Part Two, EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (No. 12-1182), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1182. 
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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two, our federal or even state legislatures are hardly truly 
representative bodies.218 Scalia himself pointed out in respect of 
constitutional amendments that "I figured it out once, I think if you 
picked the smallest number necessary for a majority in the least 
populous states, something like less than 2 percent of the population 
can prevent a constitutional amendment."219 
Moreover, if judges ignore the factual, social, and policy 
considerations in cases, this means that the law does not change, 
unless through legislative means. The law then continues to benefit 
those whom it has already privileged while often ignoring the needs 
of those who might most need its protection. Justice Kennedy foresaw 
a role for the Court in advancing justice when he noted that "when 
the rights of persons are violated, 'the Constitution requires redress 
by the courts,' notwithstanding the more general value of democratic 
decisionmaking."220 
4. Voice, Tone, and Audience 
Justice Scalia seems to have enjoyed drafting dissents, as he had 
a chance to express himself freely therein without worrying about 
accommodating other Justices' views. He once wrote: 
[Dissent] makes the practice of one's profession as a judge more 
satisfying. To be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, 
without the need to accommodate, to any degree whatever, the 
more-or-less-differing views of one's colleagues; to address 
precisely the points of law that one considers important and no 
others; to express precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, 
or disbelief, or indignation that one believes the majority's 
disposition should engender-that is indeed an unparalleled 
pleasure.221 
He also seems to have taken pride in his dissents, noting in a 
speech that he had ''hit lots of home runs in dissents, but they don't 
218. See William F. Connelly Jr. & John J. Pitney Jr., How Representative Is 
Congress?, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 23, 201 7), https://medium.corn/@ 
Brookings/how-representative-is-congress-c4605c61000d. Connelly and Pitney 
note that the Framers would scorn those who argue that Congress is 
unrepresentative because demographic characteristics do not mirror those of the 
general population or that its decisions fail to reflect public opinion on key issues. 
They do however concede that "much of the demographic mismatch between 
Congress and the public has been a symptom of discrimination and unequal 
opportunity." Id. However, it should be noted that Congress remains extremely 
unrepresentative in respect of race and gender. 
219. Senior, supra note 129. 
220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (citing Schuette v. BAMN, 
572 U.S. 291, 313 (2014)). 
221. Antonin Scalia, Dissents, 13 OAH MAG. OF HISTORY 18, 22-23 (1998). 
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make it to the scoreboard."222 Audience and some kind of recognition 
therefore seems to have been important to Scalia. A few months 
before his death, he told students at St. Thomas School of Law that 
he wrote his dissents "for you guys."223 He went on: "If I write it I 
know it will be in the casebook, because the professors need 
something to talk about."224 He suggested that by doing so he hoped 
to preserve "what he believed to be true principles of law."225 
Scalia's legal philosophy regarding dissents has implications in 
respect to the audience he might be attempting to persuade, as well 
as the sources to which he might cite in his dissents to substantiate 
his points and persuade that audience. The general public would 
likely have been oblivious to the nuances of Scalia's contentions that 
the majority was ignoring an originalist approach or subverting a 
textualist interpretation. Even in cases where he would read his 
dissents aloud from the bench and the press would report on these 
occasions, the public might not fully understand the essence of his 
philosophical disagreements with the majority opinions unless the 
case involved a salient issue like gay marriage. This suggests that 
Scalia's audience must therefore have been other lawyers, judges, the 
academy, and law students. He confirmed this when he noted that 
opinions are too complex for the press and regular people to 
understand. 226 
Additionally, although one might expect the tone of any dissent 
to convey a level of frustration that one's opinion is not being adopted 
by the majority, Scalia's dissents, particularly those read from the 
bench, were often scathing. A good dissent or opinion, as Ferguson 
222. Heather Sackett, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia Speaks at 
Conference in Mountain Village, TELLURIDE DAILY PLANET (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.telluridenews.com/news/artic1e_2e4e9b60-302e-57ad-92df-ceb0cd91 
a6b8.html. 
223. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scalia at St. Thomas: Closing Arguments, PuB. 
DISCOURSE (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/02/16501/. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Scalia did not have a high opinion of the citizenry or the press. He once 
noted, ''They're just going to report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice little 
old lady? And who is the defendant? Was this, you know, some scuzzy guy? And 
who won? Was it the good guy that won or the bad guy? And that's all you're 
going to get in a press report, and you can't blame them, you can't blame them. 
Because nobody would read it if you went into the details of the law that the court 
has to resolve. So you can't judge your judges on the basis of what you read in 
the press." Scalia's Superficial View Sells Americans Short, HERALDNET (Oct. 25, 
2006, 9:00 PM), h ttps:/ /www .heraldnet.com/opinion/ scalias-su perficial-view-sells 
-americans-short/ (quoting Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia at a talk 
sponsored by the National Italian American Foundation). See also Sackett, supra 
note 222 (statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) ("They would lose their readership 
if they tried to explain the case thoroughly."). 
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has noted, addresses and responds to the opposing viewpoint.227 This 
is consistent with the Toulminian approach and classical rhetoric, 
whereby one builds one's own ethos and comes across as a reasonable 
person by acknowledging the limitations of one's own argument, as 
well as considering and responding to opposing perspectives.228 Many 
of Scalia's bench dissents raised alternative views and approaches but 
did so in ways that Ferguson notes are "entirely within the controlling 
voice of the judicial speaker and with the foreknowledge that these 
alternatives will submit to that speaker's own authorial 
intentions."229 When Scalia would canvass alternative views he often 
wrote of them dismissively, minimizing their validity and treating 
them with sarcasm and disparagement, as if no reasonable person 
could possibly entertain such an outcome.230 In fact, Scalia tops the 
"sarcasm" index of all the Justices from 1986-2013 by a wide margin. 
The index was designed by Richard Hasen, who relied on scholars' 
descriptions of opinions and dissents in law reviews as "caustic" or 
"sarcastic."231 While Hasen's methodology might be questionable, the 
fact that Scalia was rated as "sarcastic" or "caustic" seventy-five times 
over the period 1986-2013, while the rest of the Justices combined 
only had fifty-nine such references for that period, indicates a 
consensus as to Justice Scalia's negative tone. 232 This tone does not 
suggest that he was trying to persuade his judicial colleagues to adopt 
his viewpoint. As J. Lyn Entrikin has pointed out, his dissents would 
surely have been less acerbic had he intended to bring his colleagues 
around to his line of thinking. 233 Instead, the dissents often read like 
227. Ferguson, supra note 64, at 205 ("The goal of judgment is to subsume 
difference in an act of explanation and a moment of decision."). 
228. Anthony John Kunnan describes the Toulminian argument as "a method 
of practical reasoning with a structured macrostructure of arguments. It has the 
following six categories: the claim or assertion or conclusion which is a statement 
including any qualifiers or certainty or limits, the evidence or grounds or data 
that support the claim, the warrant(s) or principle or authority or reasoning 
connecting the evidence to the claim, the backing or reasons or assurances or 
theory, if necessary for warrants, and the rebuttal(s) or exception(s) to the 
claims." Anthony John Kunnan, Test Fairness and Toulmin's Argument 
Structure, 27 LANGUAGE TESTING 183, 184 (2010). 
229. Ferguson, supra note 64, at 205. 
230. In fact, Justice Scalia ranks the highest of all justices on the "sarcasm" 
index, according to Richard L. Hasen. Richard L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic 
Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 217 (2015), http://www.greenbag.org/v18n2/v18n 
2_ex_post_hasen. pdf. 
231. Id. at 21fr.16 (finding "unparalleled" Justice Scalia's "nastiness, 
particularly directed at other Justices' opinions"). 
232. Id. at 216. 
233. See generally J. Lyn Entrikin, Disrespectful Dissent: Justice Scalia's 
Regrettable Legacy of Incivility, 18 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 201 (2017) (noting 
that Scalia found professional pleasure in writing alone rather than with 
colleagues and claimed to write for the purpose of law students reading his work 
someday). Entrikin notes, "His dissents frequently reflected uncloaked scorn for 
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a castigation, pointing out the fallacy of the majority's approach. 
Rubin asserts that in dissent Scalia became "strident and 
contentious, appealing to popular political sentiments that lie beyond 
the boundaries of the case at issue."234 Even Justice Ginsburg pointed 
out that she had suggested that he would ''be more effective if he is 
not so polemical. I'm not always successful."235 
If his colleagues on the bench were not his primary audience, 
neither was the general public in most cases, except perhaps on cases 
with major sociological implications, such as the gay rights cases and 
the ACA, as the public tends to be more concerned with the outcome 
of particular cases that engage the national interest. One is left with 
the conclusion that one of Scalia's intended audiences must have been 
posterity. He would likely want to be remembered for his consistent 
philosophy, rather than for his direct impact on his brethren or the 
public. 
Justice Scalia's rhetoric, vocabulary, and the sources to which he 
tended to cite, also confirm that his targeted audience was the legal 
academy and/or posterity. His dissents speak to the more educated 
listener and reader. Part of this may be attributed to Scalia's love of 
rhetoric and fondness for erudite phrases. As Paul Clement has 
noted, "[h]e was willing to use an unfamiliar term, and risk losing a 
lazy reader unwilling to consult the dictionary, because words have 
meaning. He did not want to dilute his message by using a more 
familiar but less precise word."236 He also took pride in his use of 
metaphors and memorable phrases. Robert Ivie has pointed out that 
metaphors are often used by dissenters as they are a "device for 
articulating a shift of perspective."237 Scalia himself recognized that 
dissents "will not be cited, and will not be remembered, unless some 
quality of thought or of expression commends them to later 
generations."238 
the majority. And although he has been celebrated in death as a brilliant judicial 
giant, his departure from the custom ofrespectful dissent marked a turning point 
in the Court's tradition of collegiality and civility." Id. at 202. She goes on to 
assert, "[a]s one scholar observed, his 'dissents have not won over many 
adherents, and in some areas, despite the force of his protest, he may well be on 
the wrong side of history."' Id. at 203 (quoting MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE COURT'S HISTORY AND THE NATION'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 407 (2015)). 
234. Edward L. Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice, 
Antonin Scalia Is (A) Great, (B) Acceptable, (C) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 
1105, 1130 (2008). 
235. Sherman, supra note "119. 
236. Paul D. Clement, Why We Read the Scalia Opinion First, 101 JUDICATURE 
52, 54 (2017). 
237. Ivie, supra note 36, at 51. 
238. Clement, supra note 236, at 55. Clement noted, "[h]is opinions, in turn, 
could send the reader to the dictionary to look up words like 'panopticon' and 
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Additionally, Scalia's oral dissents often display some rhetorical 
trickery in the persona he affected. The fact that he did not have to 
persuade other members of the Court to sign on to the opinion allowed 
him to do so; he could adopt extreme views, make esoteric word 
choices, and use a more personalized style and voice. Although Scalia 
expressed the opinion that the Court's decisions are too complex for 
ordinary people to follow, 239 he often adopted the rhetorical persona 
of the ordinary "man in the street," apparently aghast at the position 
his elitist and undemocratic colleagues in the majority had adopted. 
At times, therefore, he did appear to be speaking directly to 
ordinary, regular people, as if he were not a member of the legal and 
political elite. He accomplished this through a kind of "who do they 
think they are" tone (referring to the majority) in several of his 
dissents, along with the use of "folksy" language, colloquialisms, and 
metaphors. As Laura Krugman Ray has pointed out, in doing so, 
Scalia "attempts to position himself ... as the champion of the people, 
respecting their values and speaking their language."24° For example, 
she points out that in Casey,241 he used informal phrases like "[i]t is 
beyond me,"242 "come to think of it,"243 and "even in the head of 
someone like me,"244 as well as accusing his colleagues of engaging in 
a "verbal shell game."245 In EPA v. EME Homer City, he noted that, 
as one of his grandchildren would say, "well, duh!"246 Similarly, in 
his dissent in Obergefell, he quoted from the majority opinion which 
referred to the Court's "constitutional imperatives [to] define a 
'atavistic,' as well as allusions like 'Cheops' Pyramid,' and 'Marquis of 
Queensberry rules."' Id. at 54. 
239. Larry Kramer notes that "[c]onstitutional law is indeed complex, because 
legitimating judicial authority has offered the legal system an excuse to 
emphasize technical requirements of precedent and formal argument that 
necessarily complicated matters. But this complexity was created by the Court 
for the Court and is itself a product of judicializing constitutional law." Larry 
Kramer, The People v. Judicial Activism: Who has the Last Word on the 
Constitution?, Bos. REV. (Feb. 1, 2004), http://bostonreview.net/us/larry-kramer-
we-people. 
240. Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 229 (2002). 
241. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
242. Id. at 997 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
243. Id. at 994. 
244. Id. at 998. 
245. Id. at 987. 
246. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 06:59-7:04, Part Two, EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (No. 12-1182), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1182. The written dissent is also replete 
with phrases like "[t]he majority reaches its result ('Look Ma, no hands!')," EPA 
v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 525 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), and "[c]all it 'pin the tail on the donkey,"' id. at 539. 
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liberty''247 and followed it up with a bemused and colloquial "Huh?"248 
He also described his colleagues as a "select, patrician, highly 
unrepresentative panel of nine,"249 in some ways distracting his 
readers and listeners from the fact that he was a member of that 
select panel and was a graduate of Harvard Law and a distinguished 
law professor prior to being elevated to the Court.250 His use (or 
creation) of terms such as "jiggery-pokery"251 to describe the 
majority's reasoning in upholding the ACA sounds quaint and 
amusing but draws attention away from the fact that without the 
protection of the ACA millions of Americans would find themselves 
without health insurance. Additionally, he criticized his colleagues 
for asserting that "the context and structure of the Act compel [it] to 
depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the 
pertinent statutory phrase."252 He derided this as "pure applesauce" 
and combined this phrase with a more erudite reference when he 
went on to note "[i]mpossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on 
the Affordable Care Act!"253 Some commentators have claimed that 
"[t]hese-typical--cheap-shot one-liners are the stuff of political 
attack TV ads, not of persuasive legal writing."254 
VI. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S RESPONSIVE APPROACH: HER 
CONTEMPORARY AUDIENCE AND RECOGNITION OF SOCIETAL CHANGES 
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society." 
Justice Cardozo255 
Although Justice Ginsburg was one of the Justices known for 
reading more dissents aloud from the bench than other Justices, she 
247. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 719 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 718. 
250. See Steven A. Rosenberg, Antonin Scalia Remembered for Close Ties to 
Harvard, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:52 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
metro/2016/02/14/ scalia -remembered-for-close- ties-harvard/ qL 7tdJA Ur DJ GQK 
TN9ue0yH/story.html. 
251. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
252. Id. at 497. 
253. Id. at 500, 507. 
254. Simon Lazarus, The Scalia Problem: It Wasn't Originalism or 
Textualism-It Was Trumpism, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2018), https://prospect.org/ 
justice/scalia-problem-originalism-textualism-trumpism/; see also Lincoln 
Caplan, Forget the Tone. It's Dissent That Matters, WASH. POST (July 6, 2003), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/opinions/2003/07 /06/forget- the- tone-
its-dissent-tha t-ma tters/712efea0-6008-4f92-91d2-d2f78c2 l l 3b6/ (opining that 
"Scalia's dissents may be too sharp and his arguments too impassioned"). 
255. BENJAMJN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921). 
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nevertheless appeared not to take that responsibility lightly.256 She 
once cited Justice Scalia's words in noting, "[w]hen history 
demonstrates that one of the Court's decisions has been a truly 
horrendous mistake, it is comforting ... to look back and realize that 
at least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly and gave voice, 
often eloquent voice, to their concern."257 
Giving voice to one's concerns presupposes a level of clarity in 
writing, yet Ginsburg's opinions have been singled out as among the 
most complex by Owens and Wedeking, whereas Justice Scalia's are 
often rated among the clearest.258 However, the LIWC methodology 
used by Owens and Wedeking analyzes "attentional focus, 
emotionality, social relationships, thinking styles" and other features 
oflanguage that combine to measure "cognitive complexity."259 When 
one considers those factors in respect of Ginsburg's dissents, 
particularly the factors of emotionality and social relationships, one 
may see why Ginsburg's dissents rank as the most complex. Unlike 
Scalia, Ginsburg was not a strict textualist. Rather, she tended to 
look at the congressional intent and the impact of the case on the 
parties and on other people in the position of the parties, particularly 
women. 260 Additionally, Philip Tetlock and others have noted that 
language scored as more complex tends to "interpret events in 
multidimensional terms and to integrate a variety of evidence in 
arriving at decisions."261 Ginsburg incorporated a lot of factual 
testimony into her opinions and dissents, including testimony before 
256. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 7 (asserting that she has read 
approximately 10 percent of her dissents from the bench, more than any other 
Justice). 
257. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 5. 
258. See Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1043. The authors aver that 
"among all the justices in our sample, Justice Ginsburg's opinions were, by a 
significant margin, the most complex. Indeed, her average complexity score of 
3.28 is over twice that of the mean justice (Brennan = 1.43), and roughly four 
times greater than those of Justices Scalia and Breyer." Id. at 1044. This may 
be because Justice Scalia focused on bright line rules ("the rule of law is a law of 
rules"), which are more easily communicated. Subsequent research by Ryan C. 
Black shows the situation may also be more complex, in that liberal Justices tend 
to write clearer opinions when public opinion is skewing more conservative and 
vice versa. See RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS AND THEIR 
AUDIENCES 137-38 (2016). Note that Black is writing about majority opinions 
rather than dissents. 
259. Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of 
Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & Soc. 
PSYCH. 24, 24, 32 (2010). 
260. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Hearing the Voices of Individual Women and 
Men: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 635, 635-39 (1998). 
261. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Supreme Court Decision Making: Cognitive Style 
as a Predictor of Ideological Consistency of Voting, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCH. 1227, 1228 (1985). Neither Scalia nor Ginsburg appear in the study as 
neither one was on the Court at that time. 
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Congressional Committees, facts from the district court case rather 
than simply the facts received from the appellate court, as well as 
general social and policy-based facts and studies.262 This stands in 
contrast to a more rule-based approach like Justice Scalia's, which is 
dismissive of the facts and applies the rule, no matter the outcome. 
Another factor that sheds some insight into the complexity of 
Ginsburg's opinions is her word choice, as Gruenfeld has noted, 
"[l]anguage that scores as least complex relies on 'one-dimensional, 
evaluative rules in interpreting events' in which actors make 
decisions 'on the basis of only a few salient items of information."'263 
Interestingly, when one analyzes the oral version of dissents read 
from the bench using rhetorical clarity measures, such as the Flesch 
Kincaid and other readability tests, Justice Ginsburg's dissents are 
clearer than Justice Scalia's in terms of the levels of readability, the 
shortness of the sentences (which generally do not exceed two lines), 
the accessible vocabulary, the directness of the prose, and the clarity 
of the facts and examples provided. This all suggests that, in contrast 
to Justice Scalia's focus on posterity and the academy, Justice 
Ginsburg's audience for her oral dissents appeared to be the broader 
public (via the press) and the litigants (including people who may not 
be actual parties but who may be similarly impacted by the Court's 
decisions). Her audience was also clearly the Court itself and 
Congress where appropriate, as she spoke directly to them on 
occas10n. 
The following Subparts will explore several of Ginsburg's most 
prominent dissents with a view towards analyzing the kinds of cases 
in which she read her dissents aloud, her goals in doing so, and the 
audiences to whom the dissents are addressed. In canvassing the 
notion of audience, this Article will explore what the Justice herself 
said about her dissents, as well as the tone of those dissents and the 
authorities to which she cited, in both the oral and written versions. 
The Article will also help elucidate what these dissents tell us about 
the Justice's views on the role of the Court.264 
262. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (discussing 
congressional testimony); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 643 (2009) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (discussing district court record). 
263. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 89, at 1039 (quoting Deborah H. 
Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCH. 5, 5 (1995)). 
264. In an interview, Ginsburg noted, '"The Supreme Court doesn't have an 
agenda of its own,' she said, adding that 'it's a totally reactive institution, it 
depends upon people bringing cases before us that represent the issues."' 
Caroline Kelly, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: This Time in History Will Be Seen as 'an 
Aberration', CNN (Oct. 3, 2019, 10:18 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/03/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-justice-us-history-
aberration/index.html. 
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A. Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinions as Advocacy: Context, 
Audiences, Rhetoric, Tone, Purpose, and Authorities 
''.As we know, the role of the others for whom the utterance is 
constructed is extremely great . ... From the very beginning, the 
speaker expects a response from them, an active responsive 
understanding. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were, 
in anticipation of encountering this response. ''265 
367 
An important foundational question is: In what circumstances or 
context do Justices choose to orally dissent? Blake and Hacker 
hypothesized that this occurs when there is profound disagreement 
on the outcome of cases, not only on legal or policy grounds, but also 
based on ideological differences among the dissenting Justice and the 
majority.266 The authors also posit that the likelihood of dissenting 
from the bench increases in cases of "high salience," and when the 
case is closely decided, such as in a 5:4 split.267 Although the authors 
found that their original hypothesis regarding ideological splits did 
not prove to be the most powerful motivator in a Justice choosing to 
orally dissent,268 that factor may now have changed, as the Court has 
become more politically divided in the ten years since the study was 
conducted. When analyzing my results, as reflected in Appendix B, 
Justice Ginsburg appeared more likely to orally dissent in cases 
involving some form of discrimination, whether that was in respect to 
voting rights,269 Title VII,210 affirmative action,271 class actions,272 or 
access to contraception or abortion.273 Given the Justice's background 
and judicial philosophies, these factors do not appear to be accidental. 
Moreover, whom she is addressing and how she is addressing 
them, is also salient. In a recent interview, Justice Ginsburg was 
asked how easy it had been making the transition from an advocate 
to a Justice. Somewhat surprisingly, Ginsburg replied, "I think I'm 
still an advocate."274 She went on to point out that when she writes 
dissents, she was "always hopeful that [her] advocacy will 
265. M. M. Bakhtin, The Problem of Speech Genres, in SPEECH GENRES AND 
OTHER LATE ESSAYS 60, 94 (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., Vern W. 
McGee trans., 1986). 
266. Blake & Hacker, supra note 11, at 4-5. 
267. Id. at 9-10. My study confirmed this to be the case as fifteen out of 
eighteen of Ginsburg's oral dissents occurred in cases where there was a 5:4 split. 
The authors also found there are disincentives to orally dissent if one is the Chief 
Justice or a freshman Justice. Id. at 10. 
268. See id. at 19. 
269. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
270. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). 
271. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297 (2013). 
272. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
273. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 127 (2007). 
274. Kelly, supra note 264. 
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persuade."275 Ginsburg, like any good lawyer, is still mindful of her 
audience. "[I]t's a smaller audience," she noted, "[t]here's only nine of 
us."276 Because Ginsburg was extremely cognizant of her colleagues 
on the bench, as well as the fact that today's dissent may evolve into 
a future majority opinion, her dissents sought to engage and 
persuade, which in turn influenced her word choices and her tone. All 
of these are very different from Justice Scalia's dissents, whose 
rhetoric often seemed designed to further alienate his fellow Justices 
on the Court. Ginsburg often began her dissents from the bench with 
a cordial: "Hello, fellow members of the Court."277 Presumably she 
would have seen and greeted those fellow members prior to walking 
into the Courtroom, so addressing them personally in this way 
appears to be an attempt to engage them directly and ensure they are 
paying attention. Her language may also have helped to reassure 
those present and those who read about the oral dissent that the 
Court is an institution capable of handling dissent; and that even an 
oral dissent read aloud from the bench will not fracture it because the 
Court is still a unified body. 
Kenneth Burke once defined rhetoric as "the use of language in 
such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or 
reader."278 If one considers an oral dissent as a particular "rhetorical 
situation" to use Lloyd Bitzer's phrase,279 then one must consider the 
context in which Ginsburg chose to orally dissent, to whom her 
dissents were addressed, and how she used language, tone, and 
specific authorities in an effort to persuade and become a "mediator 
of change."280 One must also consider if the audience(s) for her oral 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. See e.g., Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 9:44-9:47, Ricci v. 
DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. June 29, 2009), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428; Press Release, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death of 
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Sept. 19, 2020), 
https:/ /www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/ pr_ 09-19-20 
(listing opinions of other Justices describing Justice Ginsburg as "the essence of 
grace, civility and dignity," a "superb judge who gave her best ... whether in 
agreement or disagreement," and who was always "civil, principled, [and] 
respectful" in her disagreements with other Justices). 
278. KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT 210 (3d ed. 1968). 
279. Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1 (1968). 
Bitzer defines a rhetorical situation as one where "rhetoric is a mode of altering 
reality, ... by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the 
mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into 
existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action, 
is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is always 
persuasive." Id. at 4. 
280. Id. at 4-5. 
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spoken dissents were different from those who read her much longer 
written dissenting opinions. 
Justice Ginsburg was far more attuned to a contemporary and 
broader audience than Justice Scalia. She was also not shy about 
communicating directly with that audience. Therefore, overall, the 
tone of Ginsburg's oral dissents remained fairly polite, unlike the 
sometimes shrill tone of Justice Scalia's. As Cynthia Fuchs Epstein 
has noted, "[h]er style has always been very ameliorative, very 
conscious of etiquette."281 While she was not hesitant to tell the Court 
where or how it has gone wrong in its majority opinion, she usually 
did so in a polite and restrained manner by urging Congress to act, if 
appropriate, or warning the Court that its decision would not stand, 
as it ignored the practical realities of people's lives.282 She ascribed 
to Brennan's view that Justices have "an obligation to bring their 
individual intellects to bear on the issues that come before the 
Court ... [W]here significant and deeply held disagreement exists, 
members of the Court have a responsibility to articulate it."283 
This sense of responsibility is an essential part of what Lani 
Guinier refers to as demosprudence. 284 Guinier characterizes this as 
occurring when a Justice is strongly opposed to the majority's position 
and the dissent is intended to "inspire nonjudicial actors to 
participate in some form of collective problem solving."285 This 
presupposes that the dissent has a ready audience which will be 
responsive to, and engage with, the dissenting opinion. As Post has 
noted, "[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of 
281. Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washington/ 
3lscotus.html. 
282. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633, 1640 (2018) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's opinion striking down a 
provision of the National Labor Relations Act ignores the reality of employer-
employee inequality that the Act was designed to mitigate, while signaling for 
Congressional correction of the Court's decision); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 645--46, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(contending the majority's interpretation of what qualifies as unlawful 
employment discrimination under Title VII discounts the realities of the 
workplace and calling on Congress to act to correct the Court's ruling). 
283. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, in THE GREAT DISSENTS 
OF THE "LoNE DISSENTER": JUSTICE JESSE W. CARTER'S TwENTY TuMlJLTUOUS 
YEARS ON THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT xxxv, xliii (David B. Oppenheimer & 
Allan Brotsky eds., 2010). Ginsburg has claimed the right to intervene, noting, 
"[w]hen a Justice is of the firm view that the majority got it wrong, she is free to 
say so in dissent. I take advantage of that prerogative, when I think it important, 
as do my colleagues." RUTH BADER GINSBURG ET AL., MY OWN WORDS xviii (2016). 
284. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 16. 
285. Id. 
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rights and law; they are participants within that debate."286 
However, if a Justice's goal was to reach a broader public audience so 
as to engage them as participants, an oral dissent must be accessible 
to that audience and will therefore not be too erudite or spend too 
much time citing largely inaccessible or incomprehensible case law. 
Guinier's construct of demosprudence is embodied in Ginsburg's 
dissenting jurisprudence. Ginsburg's oral dissents show that she did 
not consider the Court's role "to close what has been open," to use 
Wetlaufer's phrase;287 rather she used her position on the Court to 
engage others in conversation-whether those others were Congress 
or the public. Because of her own background and experiences, 
Ginsburg was acutely aware of the exclusion of and discrimination 
against women. Despite attaining the distinction of being at the top 
of her class, she struggled to find a job.288 She was rejected for a 
Supreme Court clerkship and only attained her first position through 
the machinations of one of her professors from Columbia. 289 Her work 
with the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU'') centered on 
litigating gender discrimination.290 Her own background thus 
provided Ginsburg with an ethos with her audience. She had 
credibility because those who have been excluded by the legal system 
know that at one point, she suffered along with them. Ginsburg was 
acutely attuned to any form of discrimination and exclusion, and she 
endeavored to engage her colleagues on the bench in judicial problem-
solving on these issues, using a form of narrative and feminist 
practical reasoning. 291 It is not surprising, therefore, that many of 
the cases in which she issued strongly worded dissents from the bench 
involved some form of discrimination. These included several Title 
VII and equal protection claims. 292 
286. Robert Post, Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the 
Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 B.U. L. REV. 581, 
582 (2009). 
287. Wetlaufer, supra note 16, at 1564. 
288. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/ruth_ 
bader_ginsburg. 
289. See id.; Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of 
Gender Equality, Dies at 87, NPR (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-gins burg-champion -of-gender-equality 
-dies-at-87. 
290. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, supra note 288. 
291. See Bartlett, supra note 209, for a discussion of feminist reasoning. 
Bartlett notes, "[w]hen feminists 'do law,' they do what other lawyers do: they 
examine the facts of a legal issue or dispute, they identify the essential features 
of those facts, they determine what legal principles should guide the resolution 
of the dispute, and they apply those principles to the facts. This process unfolds 
not in a linear, sequential, or strictly logical manner, but rather in a pragmatic, 
interactive manner." Id. at 836. 
292. See supra notes 102---06, 268---72 and accompanying text. 
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The fact that someone who had herself experienced 
discrimination gave voice to those who have been discriminated 
against is important. Erin Rand has noted that "a dissent written 
from a position of institutional power can provide recognition to a 
group that feels otherwise unheard and disenfranchised."293 
Moreover, Ginsburg was not a bland face of institutional power; she 
was someone with whom her audience felt a kinship-hence the RBG 
dolls, memes, and Halloween costumes. The relationship between 
Ginsburg and her audience was symbiotic, reciprocal, mutual, and 
responsive. Just as Ginsburg "recognized" the victims of 
discrimination in many of her dissents by voicing their concerns and 
using the personal pronoun "you,"294 so too did her nonlegal audience 
in turn "recognize" her by paying homage to her in contemporary pop 
culture and in responding to her dissents, knowing she had "walked 
the walk." In turn, Ginsburg's recognition of, and identification with, 
her audience was illustrated by multiple factors. First, she signaled 
to her audience what was to come by walking into the Courtroom 
wearing her special dissenting collar. 295 Adorning herself with this 
symbol ensured that the assembled press corps would immediately 
pay attention and report on Ginsburg's words. She thus reached a 
broader audience she would not otherwise reach if she did not convey 
a sense of drama and instill the expectation that a performance was 
about to occur. She also signaled to her followers that she was 
performing for them by reading her dissent aloud. Additionally, the 
fact that Ginsburg intended for her words to reach a broad audience 
was evidenced by the fact that she incorporated many clearly 
understandable facts and statistics as well as sociological authorities 
in her dissents, rather than limiting herself to solely legal ones.296 In 
doing so, she reminded the Court and the public that the Court's 
decisions were affecting the lives of real people. 
According to Smith, a published dissent "may galvanize popular 
mobilization against unpopular decisions."297 One such example of an 
audience reaction that took place as a direct response to Justice 
Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby occurred when activists, outraged 
at the exception to the ACA's contraception mandate that the 
majority carved out for Hobby Lobby, took it upon themselves to 
strategically place copies of Ginsburg's dissent in Hobby Lobby 
293. Erin J. Rand, Fear the Frill: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Uncertain 
Futurity of Feminist Judicial Dissent, 101 Q. J. SPEECH 72, 78 (2015) (citing J. 
Louis Campbell, III, The Spirit of Dissent, 66 JUDICATURE 304, 311 (1983)). 
294. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 40. 
295. See Safia Samee Ali, Justice Ginsburg Wears "Dissent" Collar Following 
Contentious Election, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016, 7:46 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/justice-ginsburg-wears-
dissent-collar-following-contentious-election -n68 l 5 71. 
296. See Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 43-44. 
297. Smith, supra note 71, at 532. 
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stores.298 They also included copies of the Seneca Falls Address and 
other texts on emancipation and women's rights.299 It is interesting 
to contrast this approach, which took the form of a robust reaction to 
a dissent occurring shortly after the dissent has been issued, with 
Justice Scalia's notion of a canonical dissent that will reverberate 
some time later in history. Ginsburg seemed more concerned with 
the "here and now" impact of her dissenting opinions. 
The strong reaction by members of the public to Ginsburg's 
dissents was not surprising. Michael Wells has suggested that when 
judges rely on sociological sources, their opinions appear to find more 
favor with the general public than when they rely on purely legal 
sources. 300 He notes that despite the fact that legal legitimacy 
indicates more fidelity to the law, sociological legitimacy "aims 
directly at public acceptance and its benefits can be grasped in the 
short term."301 In this sense it "provides the public with a rationale 
it prefers."302 Additionally, sociological concepts are generally more 
relatable than principles of textualism or originalism, which were 
more often relied on by Justice Scalia. But Ginsburg's audience was 
not narrow. She had multiple audiences: specifically, her colleagues 
on the bench whom she often addressed directly, the litigants and the 
general public who felt heard by her, and the academy and posterity. 
Many of these audiences were often specifically addressed in her 
dissents. For Katie Gibson, Ginsburg's "judicial rhetoric is 
transformative: it ... shifts the language of the law to legitimate 
voices, experiences, and rights of groups traditionally excluded by the 
rhetoric of the law."sos 
Justice Ginsburg appeared to ultimately believe that the law was 
flexible enough to recognize and respond to social realities, and it is 
those social realities on which she often focused during her dissents. 
Unlike Justice Scalia's strict adherence to a narrow reading of the 
text, Ginsburg asserted that facts matter, and she endeavored to 
communicate that belief to a broader audience than just her 
colleagues. This belief and methodology appear to be rooted in a 
feminist practical reasoning approach. Katherine Bartlett described 
298. Rand, supra note 293, at 80. 
299. Id. 
300. See Michael L. Wells, "Sociological Legitimacy" in Supreme Court 
Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011 (2007). Wells asserts that "political and 
social aims may drive the outcomes of hard cases even when they receive 
comparatively little attention in the opinions." Id. at 1013-14. Wells defines the 
concepts of legal versus sociological legitimacy as follows: "[l]egal legitimacy 
requires that an opinion candidly state the reasons for the outcome. Sociological 
legitimacy is achieved by an opinion that secures public acceptance of the Court's 
rulings." Id. at 1014. 
301. Id. at 1024. 
302. Id. 
303. Katie L. Gibson, In Defense of Women's Rights: A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Judicial Dissent, 35 WOMEN'S STUD. COMM. 123, 124 (2012). 
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such an approach as resting on the understanding that an effective 
resolution of a legal problem depends "on the basis of the intricacies 
of each specific factual context."304 The practical reasoning approach 
also incorporates the views and perspectives of those who have 
traditionally been considered "outsiders" by the law.305 Kathryn 
Stanchi and Linda Berger have pointed out that "[f]eminist practical 
reasoning rejects the notion that there is a monolithic source for 
reason, values and justifications."306 This way of viewing the law 
stands in stark contrast to the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia who 
believed that there was a general inherently valid body of authority: 
the Constitution as established by the Framers, the text, or 
established precedent.307 
By adopting the practical reasoning approach in several of her 
oral dissents, Ginsburg pointed out the injustices being done by the 
majority and marshalled support for viewing the issue before the 
Court from the perspectives of those of whom the law has not 
traditionally taken notice. Ginsburg often pointed out the impact of 
the Court's decision not only on the litigants, but on others in the 
same position. This reaching out beyond solely the litigants before 
the Court and addressing the entire community of legal and nonlegal 
actors is important, as it illuminated Ginsburg's acknowledgment of 
"lived realities." It was a recognition of the people who were similarly 
situated to the petitioners or who cared about the issues that were 
before the Court. Ginsburg thus showed these people that she heard 
and understood their position and recognized the realities of their 
situation. As few people take the time to read a Supreme Court 
opinion and dissent,308 having the press report on a dissent read from 
the bench communicates the opinion to a far broader audience-and 
304. Bartlett, supra note 209, at 851. 
305. See generally LAW AND OUTSIDERS: NORMS, PROCESSES AND 'OTHERING' IN 
THE TwENTY-FlRST CENTURY (Cian C. Murphy & Penny Green eds., 2011) (the 
editors select thirteen essays from leading young scholars to demonstrate "the 
way in which rules and processes are contributing to the creation of twenty-first-
century 'others"' in different areas). 
306. Kathryn M. Stanchi et al., Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments 
Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 3, 15 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016). 
307. See John S. Baker, Jr., et al., Justice Scalia on Federalism and 
Separation of Powers, Panel Discussion Before 2016 National Lawyers 
Convention (Nov. 17, 2016), in 30 REGENT U. L. REV. 57, 65 (2017) (John S. Baker 
speaking). 
308. See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: An Opinion is Worth at Least 
a Tlwusand Words (Corrected), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2018, 12:03 PM), 
h ttps ://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/em pirical-scotus-an-opinion-is-worth-at-
least-a-thousand-words/. Feldman's analysis has shown that these have 
increased in length in recent years with the average majority opinion coming in 
at around 2,800 words in 1955 to an average of 6,300 words in 2014. Id. Thus, 
it is unlikely the public would spend the time reading them. 
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in far more accessible language-than the published dissent. 
Moreover, the dissent was more likely to be reported on more widely 
because of the popular persona that Ginsburg created that has been 
augmented by props like her famous dissenting collar. 
As someone who was trying to make the system more responsive 
to social change and bring about changes to the status quo, Ginsburg 
was more likely to focus on the facts of a particular case, or changed 
social circumstances, to illustrate that having recourse solely to 
existing precedent may entrench current inequalities. 309 This is 
consistent with the Aristotelian approach to argument, which asserts 
that history and context matter and that facts are extremely 
important.310 In focusing on facts, Ginsburg was making particular 
rhetorical choices, wherein she often used the narratives of those 
particularly impacted by the Court's decision to communicate her 
opposition to the majority opinion. As Berger has pointed out, this 
type of "rhetoric is able to accommodate diversity and imagine 
change, based in human experience, sensitive to middle grounds, and 
in opposition to all-or-nothing judgments."311 Hence it is no surprise 
that her dissents are the most complex of the Justices in Owens and 
Wedeking's study. 
Aligning herself with the feminist narrative approach, which 
presents the facts of the case as a story, compels both the author and 
the reader to acknowledge the impact that the Court's decisions will 
have on the subject of the story.312 Given how keenly attuned to 
stories of law's "outsiders" Ginsburg was, several trends emerge in 
Ginsburg's dissents: (1) They were more likely to occur in cases 
involving discrimination; she emphasized the facts of the case, 
particularly if they were egregious; (2) Her opinions were more 
accessible to the lay reader, (i.e., easily readable) as they were 
designed to speak directly to the people who had similar experiences 
as the litigants; (3) They often relied on sources other than traditional 
legal precedent to illustrate changing societal needs and expectations; 
and, (4) They urged Congress to act (if appropriate) or warned the 
Court that its majority opinion did not settle the matter. 
309. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 6----7. 
310. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric''.· A Place to 
Stand, 16 LEGAL WRITING 3, 4S-49 (2010). 
311. Id. at 12. 
312. See generally Linda L. Berger et al., Learning from Feminist Judgments: 
Lessons in Language and Advocacy, 98 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 57 (2019) 
(describing how feminist judgments often weave in the "stories of individuals 
affected by injustice"). 
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B. Emphasizing the Facts and the Implications of the Majority's 
Decision 
As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have noted, telling 
the stories of litigants is an important undertaking. 313 Facts are often 
interpreted by the hearer. Amsterdam and Bruner argue: 
[T]he framing and adjudication of legal issues necessarily rest 
upon interpretation. Results cannot be arrived at entirely by 
deductive, analytic reasoning or by the rules of induction .... 
There always remains the "wild card" of all interpretation-the 
consideration of context, that ineradicable element in meaning 
making. And the deepest, most impenetrable feature of context 
lies in the minds and culture of those involved in fashioning an 
interpretation."314 
Ginsburg appears to have instinctively recognized this, 
particularly in respect to cases involving discrimination, where her 
practical, pragmatic, fact-based approach to legal problem-solving 
was evident in multiple dissents. In the Title VII cases for example, 
she pointed to the context in asserting "Title VII was meant to govern 
real world employment practices and that world is what the court 
ignores today."315 In Coleman,316 a case involving alleged violations 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), she argued that: 
The Act was designed to promote women's opportunities to live 
balanced lives at home having gainful employment .... The 
best way to protect women against losing their jobs because of 
pregnancy or childbirth, Congress determined was not to order 
leaves for women only, for that would deter employers from 
hiring them."317 
She placed emphasis on the facts and context of the case and 
statute when she noted that "Congress received evidence from 
individuals and organizations documenting pervasive discrimination 
against women based on pregnancy or the potential to become 
pregnant."318 She went on to point out "a woman's childbearing 
capacity and attendant myths about motherhood and women's lack of 
313. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAw: How 
COURTS RELY ON STORYTELLING, AND How THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE 
UNDERSTAND THE LAW-AND OURSELVES 283 (2000). 
314. Id. at 287. 
315. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:44-7:51, Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), https://www.oyez.org/cases/ 
2006/05-107 4. 
316. Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). 
317. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:25-1:03, Part Two, Coleman v. Ct. 
of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (No. 10-1016), https://www.oyez.org/cases/ 
2011/10-1016. 
318. Id. at 1:15-1:28. 
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commitment to work underlie the historic and not yet banished 
discrimination against women in gainful employment."319 Similarly, 
in Nassar, 320 a case involving a claim for constructive discharge and 
retaliation after alleged discrimination and harassment by a 
supervisor against the complainant doctor, one could almost see her 
imagined public audience nodding along when she described how "[a]s 
anyone with employment experience can easily grasp, in-charge 
employees authorized to assign and control subordinate employees' 
daily work are aided in accomplishing the harassment by the 
superintending position in which their employer places them, and for 
that reason, the employer is properly held responsible for their 
misconduct."321 
1. The Broader Accessibility of Her Oral Dissents 
Oral dissents are often reported in the popular press, especially 
when Ginsburg dissented from the bench.322 Knowing that she had 
to condense often lengthy written dissents to a brief ten-minute oral 
version, Ginsburg and other Justices who orally dissented had to 
choose their focus and determine which authorities would best and 
most accessibly convey their point. As a result, her message was often 
extremely direct, given its brevity and the minimal cites to precedent. 
Additionally, Ginsburg's oral dissents often extended to a 
consideration of the broader implications of the Court's decisions. For 
example, in Epic Systems, 323 Ginsburg focused on the very practical 
costs involved in bringing an individual case for overtime pay against 
the company. The case involved the rights of workers to bring claims 
against their employer as a collective action after they had signed 
contracts agreeing to individual arbitration and waiving their rights 
to benefit from collective proceedings. 324 Ginsburg pointed out that 
"[t]he expenses entailed in seeking redress and the risk of employer 
retaliation would likely dissuade most workers from seeking redress 
alone .... [F]or workers striving to gain from their employer's decent 
terms and conditions of employment there is strength in numbers."325 
She cited calculations that showed that workers would likely "spend 
$200,000 to recover only $1,867.02 in overtime pay and an equivalent 
319. Id. at 2:47-3:02. 
320. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). 
321. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 3:52-4:18, Part Two, Univ. of Tex. 
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (No. 12-484), https://www.oyez.org/ 
cases/2012/12-484. 
322. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 2. 
323. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
324. Id. at 1619. 
325. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:19-0:34, 1:37-1:48, Part Two, Epic 
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/ 
cases/2017/16-285. 
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amount in liquidated damages."326 She went on to note that "[t]he 
inevitable result of today's decision [is that] there will be huge 
underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance 
the well-being of vulnerable workers."327 In the written dissent, she 
also performed an historical and text-based analysis of the relevant 
statutes and critiqued the majority extensively for its inappropriate 
use of the ejusdem generis canon.328 Needless to say, this canon did 
not warrant a mention in the oral dissent, which was aimed at the 
press and a more popular, less erudite, audience. 
In Shelby County v. Holder, 329 Ginsburg began her oral dissent 
with the following premise, describing the context within which the 
case unfolded: "First, race-based voting discrimination still exists, no 
one doubts that."330 She went on to painstakingly describe facts that 
illustrated just how much of a problem it still is, noting: 
Over a span of more than 20 months, the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees held 21 hearings heard from scores of 
witnesses, received numerous investigative reports and other 
documentation showing that serious and widespread 
intentional discrimination persists in covered jurisdictions. 331 
In her dissent, Ginsburg went into extensive factual detail to 
show that racial discrimination was still a congressionally recognized 
problem and that the Voting Rights Act (''VRA'') was still necessary 
to police redistricting and racial gerrymandering when she pointed 
out: 
In all, the legislative records filled more than 15,000 pages, 
Representative Sensenbrenner, then the Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee, described the record supporting the 
authorization as one of the most extensive considerations of any 
piece of legislation that the United States Congress had dealt 
with in the 27 and a half years he had served in the House. 
The Reauthorization passed the House by a vote of 39O-to-33. 
326. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
327. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:07-7:20, Part Two, Epic Sys. Corp. 
v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-
285; see also Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (''The 
inevitable result of today's decision will be the underenforcement of federal and 
state statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers."). 
328. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
329. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
330. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 0:06-0:13, Part Two, Shelby County 
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-
96. 
331. Id. at 3:05-3:26. 
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The vote in the Senate was 98-to-0. 
President Bush signed the reauthorization a week after he 
received it, noting the need for further work in the fight against 
injustice and calling the extension an example of our continued 
commitment to a united America where every person is treated 
with dignity and respect.aa2 
Likewise, in her oral dissent in National Federation u. 
Sebelius, 333 a case involving the constitutionality of the ACA, she 
pointed out the very practical, relatable fact that in 2009, 
approximately fifty million people were uninsured. She noted that 
"Congress was aware that the vast majority of those people lack 
insurance not by choice .... "334 Her written dissent was more erudite 
as she referred to the Framers enacting the Commerce Clause in 
response to "the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution 
itself."335 She cited to Madison's papers and a letter from George 
Washington to Madison, as well as Federalist No. 34 to support her 
position. 336 Her popular audience might be surprised by this. 
2. An Acknowledgment of Changing Societal Needs and 
Practical Realities 
Ginsburg viewed the access to contraception case, Hobby 
Lobby,337 and the abortion case, Carhart,338 as cases involving 
discrimination against women because they denied women access to 
the full range of reproductive rights. In Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg 
described how "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation, ... has been facilitated by their 
ability to control their reproductive lives."339 She went even further 
332. Id. at 3:27-4:22. 
333. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 589 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
334. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 7:22-7:34, Nat'l Fed'n oflndep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 589 (2011) (No. 111-393), https://www.oyez.org/ 
cases/2011/11-393; see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 592. 
335. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 599 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 
460 U.S. 226, 244, 245 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
336. See id. at 600-01 (citing language in support of a centralized national 
government equipped with the power to adapt to future societal changes). 
337. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 740 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In the [majority's] view, [the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act] demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious 
beliefs no matter the impact ... [felt by] thousands of women employed by [such 
corporations)."). 
338. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170-71 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the Court's decision that ''blesses [abortion restrictions] 
with no exception safeguarding a woman's health" as "alarming''). 
339. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 741 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)). 
2021] DISSENTING FROM THE BENCH 379 
in Carhart, noting that challenges to the Partial Birth Abortion Act 
''hone-in on a woman's autonomy to decide for herself."340 This, 
Ginsburg argued, was an example of the Court trying to "shield□ the 
woman by denying her any choice in the matter and this way of 
protecting women recalls ancient notions about women's place in 
society ... ideas that have long since been discredited."341 In 
Ledbetter,342 an equal pay case, Ginsburg chided the Court for failing 
to "comprehend or [being] indifferent to the insidious way in which 
women can be victims of pay discrimination."343 She pointed out the 
very practical and relatable fact that "[a]n employee like Ledbetter 
trying to succeed in a male dominated workplace in a job filled only 
by men before she was hired, understandably maybe anxious to avoid 
making waves."344 Likewise, in Fisher,345 an affirmative action case, 
she asserted, "I have several times explained why government actors 
including state universities need not blind themselves to the still 
lingering everyday evident effects of centuries of law sanctioned 
inequality."346 The metaphor that she employed in Ricci347 aptly 
summed up the Court's aversion to taking practical realities into 
account. It is, she claimed, "[l]ike the chess player who tries to win 
by sweeping the opponent's pieces off the table, the Court simply 
shuts this reality from view."348 In Texas v. Southwestern Medical 
Center,349 she chided that the "Court shows little regard for trial 
judges who must instruct juries in Title VII cases in which plaintiffs 
allege both status-based discrimination and retaliation. Nor is the 
Court concerned about the capacity of jurors to follow instructions 
conforming to today's decision."350 Again in Ricci she scolded the 
majority: "Congress endeavored to promote equal 
opportunity .... The damage today's decision does to that objective is 
untold."351 
340. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 9:13---9:17, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 682 (2007) (No. 05-380), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-380. 
341. Id. at 13:12-13:34. 
342. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
343. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 4:01--4:12, Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), 
https://www .oyez.org/cases/2006/05-107 4. 
344. Id. at 8:22-8:37. 
345. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013). 
346. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 2:35-2:49, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-345), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/ll-
345. 
347. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
348. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 16:00-16:10, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009) (No. 07-1428), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428. 
349. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). 
350. Id. at 383 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
351. Oral Dissent of Justice Ginsburg at 19:27-19:40, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009) (No. 07-1428), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428. 
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Ginsburg once again reminded the Court that context is 
important in National Federation, a case involving the ACA.352 She 
pointed out that "[t]he provision of health care is today a concern of 
national dimension, just as the provision of old-age and survivors' 
benefits was in the 1930's."353 In citing to a blog post, she raised the 
practical consideration that "when hospitals divert time and 
resources to provide uncompensated care, the quality of care the 
hospitals deliver to those with insurance drops significantly."354 She 
went on to remind her audience that "[a]ll of us will need health care, 
some sooner, some later, but we can't tell when, where or how dire 
our need will be. A healthy 21-year-old, for example, may tomorrow 
be the victim of an accident .... In the fullness of time, today's young 
and healthy will become society's old and infirm."355 
3. Firing A Shot Across the Bow-A Call to Congressional 
Action 
Her fellow Justices on the Court, the litigants themselves, and 
the public, were not Justice Ginsburg's only audiences. In several of 
her dissents she addressed herself to Congress directly. In Epic 
Systems she urged that "Congressional action is urgently needed in 
order to correct the Court's elevation of the Arbitration Act over 
workers' right to act in concert."356 Ginsburg's exhortation to 
Congress was a familiar one. It is one that she made in Ledbetter, 
which resulted in Congress enacting the Fair Pay Act shortly 
thereafter.357 Ginsburg did not pretend that she was not addressing 
Congress directly. When she visited Harvard to give a talk there, 
then-Dean Elena Kagan asked Justice Ginsburg to describe her 
intended audience in Ledbetter. Ginsburg replied: "[I]t was Congress. 
Speaking to Congress, I said, 'You did not mean what the Court said. 
So fix it.'"358 
Some of Ginsburg's dissents seem to reflect a desire to create an 
antidiscrimination canon. She conveyed a sense of urgency, that the 
352. Id. at 530. 
353. Id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
354. Id. at 594 (citing Sarah Kliff, High Uninsured Rates Can Kill You-Even 
If You Have Coverage, WASH. POST (May 7, 2012), https://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/ezra -klein/post/%20high-uninsured-rates-can-kill-you -even-if-
you-have-coverage/2012/%2005/07 /glQALNHN8T_print.html). 
355. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 2:57-3:16, 4:20-4:28, Part Three, Nat'l 
Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-393), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393. 
356. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 7:20-7:33, Part Two, Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (No. 16-285), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-
285. 
357. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat. 5. 
358. Quoted in Lani Guinier, Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 
supra note 72, at 439. 
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situation must be remedied now. Her dissents embody a commitment 
to the idea that not only can things change-they should. In National 
Federation she opined that the Court's decision "should not have 
staying power"359-a sentiment she had earlier employed in Ricci in 
almost identical words. 360 In a potentially canonical dissent in Shelby 
County, she closed with the following prophetic words: "The great men 
who led the march from Selma to Montgomery and their call for the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act foresaw progress even in Alabama. 
'The arc of the moral universe is long,"' she quoted, '"but it bends 
toward justice if there is a steadfast commitment to see the task 
through to completion.' That commitment has been disserved by 
today's decision."361 
4. Tone of Voice When Reading Dissents 
Although the New York Times has described Ginsburg's tone as 
impassioned when reading her dissents,362 most of them were 
delivered in her normal quiet, well-modulated voice. A CNN article 
described Ginsburg's tone in Epic Systems as "forceful."363 However, 
that tone emanated more from her language, which included phrases 
such as "egregiously wrong,"364 and "destructive result,"365 rather 
than her actual tone of voice. One of her friends agrees that her tone 
became more vehement, noting "she [was] seeing that basic issues 
she's fought so hard for are in jeopardy, and she is less bound by what 
have been the conventions of the court."366 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The problem with engaging in these types of conversations from 
the bench is that they challenge the very notion of the Supreme Court 
as the final arbiter of disputes and, in the eyes of some, undermines 
the authority of the Court. O'Donnell points out that "[w]hile a robust 
dissenting tradition encourages the free exchange of ideas, the 
Supreme Court unquestionably speaks most forcefully when it uses a 
359. Nat'l. Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 590 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also used this exact phrase in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
360. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 609 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
361. Oral Dissent Justice Ginsburg at 9:47-10:20, Part Two, Shelby County 
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-
96. 
362. Greenhouse, supra note 281. 
363. Joan Biskupic, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Takes Off the Gloves, CNN (Aug. 
13, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/21/politics/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-gloves-of£lindex.html. 
364. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1633 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
365. Id. at 1645. 
366. Greenhouse, supra note 281 (quoting Cynthia Fuchs Epstein). 
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single, unanimous voice."367 However, these continuing 
conversations are important for the health of our democracy. The 
lessons of dissent in Plessy, Korematsu, and others show that the 
Justices have an obligation to speak not only to their colleagues on 
these issues but to Congress and the broader public too. Moreover, a 
dissent is not just for a future day. It is for the here and now. An oral 
dissent can engage a broader audience than just the profession in the 
conversation. A five- to ten-minute broadly accessible description of 
the issues in the case and the reasons why the Justice is dissenting 
engages the broader public in a dialogue. 
As Guinier has noted, "oral dissents create salient moments of 
democratic accountability when constitutional law meets 
constitutional culture."368 The judges are speaking in oral dissent. 
Where the conversations go from there is up to their respective 
audiences. 
367. Michael O'Donnell, What's the Point of a Supreme Court Dissent?, 
THENATION (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/whats-
the-point-of-a-supreme-court-dissent/. 
368. Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, supra note 72, at 54. 
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